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Combating Unsolicited Sales Calls: The "Do-Not-Call"
Approach to Solving the Telemarketing Problem
I. INTRODUCTION
If you have a telephone in your home, it is likely you have been interrupted at a
highly inopportune moment by an overeager telemarketer's "courtesy" call.' You are in
good company-in 1990, Congress found that eighteen million Americans received
telephone solicitation pitches each day.2 While these calls generate substantial revenue3
for telemarketers and those who employ them, many homeowners consider them to be
anything but courteous. 4 According to one journalist, "unwanted calls ... have trans-
formed Alexander Graham Bell's marvelous invention into an instrument of torture in
1. See VS Maniam, Letter From America: Tightrope Walk for Bush, STATESMAN (India), Jan 23, 2001,
available in 2001 WL 4381410 (noting that the American Dialect Society chose "courtesy call," meaning "an
unsolicited call from a telemarketer," as the most euphemistic term of 2000 at its January 2001 meeting). In
using this terminology, commercial telephone solicitors would apparently have homeowners believe that
calling them just as they sit down to dinner is a great favor, for which consumers should be thankful. In an
episode of his NBC sitcom, however, comedian Jerry Seinfeld suggested otherwise. Consider the "Seinfeld
method" for dealing with telemarketers:
UNIDENTIFIED ACTRESS: Well, I...
[SEINFELD]: I'm sorry. Excuse me one second.
(PHONE RINGING)
Hello.
[TELEMARKETER]: Hi. Would you be interested in switching over to TMI long-distance ser-
vice?
SEINFELD: Oh, gee, I can't talk right now. Why don't you give me your home number and I'll
call you later?
(LAUGHTER)
[TELEMARKETER]: Well, I'm sorry. We're not allowed to do that.
SEINFELD: I guess you don't want people calling you at home.
[TELEMARKETER]: No.
SEINFELD: Well, now you know how I feel.
CNN Today: Several States Considering Legislation That Would Restrict Telemarketing (CNN television
broadcast, Jan. 12, 2001) (transcript available in LEXIS, News, Transcript # 0101121 1'3) [hereinafter CNN
Today].
2. See Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, § 2(3), 105 Stat. 2394, 2394.
The entire Congressional Statement of Findings from the Telephone Consumer Protection Act is reprinted in a
note following the codified version of the Act. See 47 U.S.C. § 227 note (1994).
3. Telemarketing generated more than $612 billion in sales last year. See CNN Today, supra note 1 (cit-
ing industry sources).
4. Studies show that only 1% of the population likes to receive unsolicited calls and 69% of people find
telemarketing offensive. See Hilary B. Miller & Robert R. Biggerstaff, Application of the Telephone Consumer





The telephone has been called "a uniquely invasive technology" because it essen-
tially "allows solicitors to come 'into' the home.",6 Many homeowners are particularly
annoyed by telemarketing calls because, unlike junk mail or television commercials, the
telephone cannot be ignored at leisure. It demands sudden, undivided attention-no
matter how busy the consumer might happen to be when the phone rings.7 Although
some recipients of these calls do purchase the tele-peddled wares, many others have
found the intrusion serious enough to warrant calls to governmental agencies. Bob
Crawford, who heads Florida's Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, has
said that "'[clomplaints about telephone solicitation calls are among the top consumer
complaints received by our office."
8
The consumers may be frustrated by telemarketing calls,9 but this does not
necessarily mean that the government can ban them. Any remedy to the problem of
undesired unsolicited calls must balance the privacy interests of homeowners against the
free expression interest of telemarketers.' ° According to Sherrie Marshall, a former
commissioner at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), "'I[t]elemarketing, by
its very nature, presents policymakers with two seemingly conflicting interests: those of
responsible telemarketers trying to conduct their business, and those of consumers with
legitimate expectations of privacy in their... homes... ,,,"" With this in mind, various
governmental bodies-and even some private groups-have attempted to appease those
consumers who are fed up with sales calls without infringing upon the rights of telemar-
keters. This Note examines what can be done, what is being done, and what ought to be
done to help quell consumer unrest without arbitrarily crippling the telemarketing efforts
of legitimate businesses.
While there may be no easy answer to the telemarketing problem, this Note argues
that recent legislative efforts by states to compile lists of consumers who do not wish to
5. Timothy B. Wheeler, Bill Aims to Disconnect Telephone Solicitors: State Would Maintain a Do-Not-
Call List, BALT. SUN, Feb. 6, 2000, at IA, available in 2000 WL 4858490 [hereinafter Wheeler, Bill Aims to
Disconnect Telephone Solicitors].
6. Joseph R. Cox, Note, Telemarketing, the First Amendment, and Privacy: Expanding Telemarketing
Regulations Without Violating the Constitution, 17 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 403,420 (1996).
7. See id. at 404.
8. Matt Moore, State Can Block Some Telemarketers -for a Price, NEWS HERALD, Jan. 22, 1998, avail-
able in News Herald: Local News (visited Oct. 16, 2000)
<http://www.newsherald.com/archive/local/tm012298.htm>.
9. See, e.g., A] Martinez, Sorry, Wrong Number, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2001, at B1, available in 2001 WL
2450212 ("We're under assault .. because all those cash-hungry companies out there don't give a rat's kazoo
how much they intrude, as long as they make money. They don't care about our privacy, our safety, our stress
rate or our homicidal tendencies.").
10. See Mark S. Nadel, Rings of Privacy: Unsolicited Telephone Calls and the Right of Privacy, 4 YALE
J. ON REG. 99, 101 (1986).
11. Communications, FCC Privacy Rules Will Balance Consumer, Business Interests, Marshall Says,
BNA DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES, May 20, 1992, available in LEXIS, News, BNA Daily Report for
Executives.
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receive unsolicited sales calls ("do-not-call lists") are a step in the right direction. 2 Part
II briefly discusses the constitutional background of telemarketing regulation. Part III
outlines current regulations and their drawbacks. Part IV focuses specifically on the do-
not-call list solution, including the practical and potential constitutional limitations of
no-call laws. Finally, Part V provides a summary and concludes that do-not-call legisla-
tion, while not a panacea for the telemarketing problem, offers greater promise than
existing alternatives.
H. BACKGROUND ON THE REGULATION OF TELEMARKETING
Although a majority of the population favors restrictions on telemarketing," 3 and
while some would probably applaud the eradication of the industry, any potential rem-
edy must be fair to the interests and rights of telemarketers as well as consumers. Con-
gress recognized as much when it enacted the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of
1991 (TCPA).14 According to the related congressional findings, "[i]ndividuals' privacy
rights... and commercial freedoms of speech and trade must be balanced in a way that
protects the privacy of individuals and permits legitimate telemarketing practices.,"
15
This balancing of constitutional interests is surveyed in a 1986 article by Professor Mark
Nadel.
16
Professor Nadel begins his discussion by noting that the "constitutional right to pri-
vacy supports regulation protecting individuals against undesired unsolicited phone
calls.""7 At the same time, the First Amendment protects the commercial speech of tele-
marketers.18 Because free speech interests are at stake, the Supreme Court is unlikely "to
tolerate broad bans on unsolicited [sales] calls."' 9 Nevertheless, Nadel states, it is "pos-
sible that less drastic solutions exist., 20 One possible answer to consumer frustration
might be to allow homeowners to somehow notify telemarketers that they do not wish to
be called.2' This solution would be similar to efforts by homeowners, cited with ap-
proval by the judiciary, to avoid being contacted by door-to-door solicitors.22 Although
12. These lists are referred to as "do-not-call" or "no-call" listings throughout this Note; states with do-
not-call laws mandate that telemarketers obtain and honor them.
13. See, e.g., Miller & Biggerstaff, supra note 4, at 686 (noting that published studies indicate that 75%
of people favor telemarketing restrictions).
14. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (1994).
15. Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, § 2(9), 105 Stat. 2394, 2394.
16. See generally Nadel, supra note 10, at 101-06 (discussing the interplay between privacy rights and
the freedom of expression).
17. Id.at101.
18. See id. (citing Virginia S'ate Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748 (1976)).
19. Id. at 105.
20. Id.
21. The TCPA and state no-call statutes, both discussed infra, are presumptively legal under this ration-
ale.
22. The Supreme Court, in dicta, has distinguished between local ordinances that impose total bans on
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the Supreme Court has invalidated blanket restrictions on door-to-door canvassing, it
has noted that ordinances providing for the prosecution of canvassers who ignored "no
solicitors" signs erected by homeowners are presumptively constitutional.2 3
Reasonable regulation of telemarketing-and door-to-door solicitation, for that mat-
ter-is unlikely to trigger intense constitutional debate. According to Professor Nadel,
"[c]ourts have consistently held that an individual's privacy right is paramount when he
is at home., 24 Furthermore, the Court has stated that "'in the privacy of the home... the
individual's right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an
intruder." 25 While telemarketers do have a legitimate interest in marketing their prod-
ucts and services, that interest is probably insufficient to outweigh the consumer's pri-
vacy interest26-provided that he is using a private telephone line within his own
home.27
door-to-door solicitation and those that merely give individual homeowners the right to notify solicitors that
they do not wish to be bothered. In Martin v. City of Struthers, the Court struck down a Struthers, Ohio ordi-
nance that made it unlawful for solicitors ""'distributing handbills, circulars or other advertisements to ring the
door bell, sound the door knocker, or otherwise summon the inmate or inmates of any residence to the door for
the purpose of receiving such handbills, circulars or other advertisements they or any person with them may be
distributing.' Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 142 (1943) (quoting city ordinance). The Court
recognized that the law traditionally "punishes persons who enter onto the property of another after having
been warned by the owner to keep off," id. at 147, but found that the Struthers ordinance was unconstitutional
because it "makes a person a criminal trespasser if he enters the property of another for an innocent purpose
without an explicit command from the owners to stay away," id. at 148.
In its opinion, the Martin Court noted that "[tihe National Institute of Municipal Law Officers has pro-
posed a form of regulation to its member cities which would make it an offense for any person to ring the bell
of a householder who has appropriately indicated that he is unwilling to be disturbed." Id. Although the Court
reserved judgment as to the wisdom or validity of that specific proposal, see id. at 148 n.13, it found no gen-
eral problem with such proposals because "[tihis or any similar regulation leaves the decision as to whether
[solicitors] may lawfully call at a home where it belongs-with the homeowner himself' Id. at 148. According
to the Court, "[a] city can punish those who call at a home in defiance of the previously expressed will of the
occupant .. . . Id. Similar to these no-solicitation ordinances, do-not-call legislation enables a governmental
body to punish solicitors who telephone homeowners in defiance of their previously expressed will. Under the
Court's logic in Martin, do-not-call proposals aimed at curbing telephone solicitation appear reasonable.
23. See Nadel, supra note 10, at 105 n.34 (citing Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't,
444 U.S. 620, 639 (1980)). In Village of Schaumburg, the Court struck down an ordinance that prohibited
door-to-door or on-street solicitation of charitable contributions by charities that did not use at least 75% of the
donations they received for charitable purposes. The Court did so because the challenged legislation was "not
directed to the unique privacy interests of persons residing in their homes because it applie[d] not only to door-
to-door solicitation, but also to solicitation on 'public streets and public ways."' Village of Schaumburg, 444
U.S. at 638-39. Nevertheless, the Court noted, "[ojther provisions of the ordinance, which [were] not chal-
lenged .... such as the provision permitting homeowners to bar solicitors from their property by posting signs
reading 'No Solicitors or Peddlers Invited,' . . . suggest the availability of less intrusive and more effective
measures to protect privacy." Id. at 639 (citing Rowan v. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970); Martin v.
City of Struthers, 319 U.S. at 148).
24. Nadel, supra note 10, at 102 (citations omitted).
25. Id. (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (citing Rowan v. Post Office Dep't,
397 U.S. 728 (1970)).
26. See id. at 104 (noting that "privacy interests may prevail over speech interests in the homes of recipi-
ents").
27. Current legislation does not restrict telemarketers from calling businesses. See Private Citizen, Inc. -
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Telephone calls may be a relatively cheap and effective way of marketing products
to consumers.2 8 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit has said '"[tihat more people may be
more easily and cheaply reached.., is not enough to [call forth] constitutional protec-
tion for what those charged with public welfare reasonably think is a nuisance.., when
easy means of publicity are open."' 29 Accordingly, the Constitution would not seem to
bar legislative efforts to rein in telemarketers.3 ° In fact, just the opposite seems true.
According to Jennifer Radner, "[tihe [Supreme] Court appears to be extremely vigilant
in shielding the sanctity of the home from unwanted communications.., as long as the
statutorily approved method of preventing the communication involves some affirmative
action by the homeowner.",3 1 All of the regulations discussed infra require affirmative
action by consumers and, therefore, should survive any constitutional challenges that
telemarketers might bring under the First Amendment.
HI. CURRENT ATTEMPTS AT TELEMARKETING REGULATION
Telemarketing is now "a booming national industry., 32 According to Congress,
"[t]he use of the telephone to market goods and services to... home[s]... has become
pervasive" due to increasingly "cost-effective telemarketing techniques." 33 The resulting
increase in telemarketing activity in recent years34 has spurred numerous efforts to pro-
tect consumer privacy-some of which have been more successful than others. Thus far,
The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991: A Consumer's View (last modified Mar. 6, 2001)
<http://www.private-citizen.com/tcpa.html> [hereinafter A Consumer's View of the TCPA]. Professor Nadel
notes that it does not seem desirable to regulate unsolicited telemarketing calls to businesses because there is a
lesser degree of privacy at the workplace, and because receptionists can screen out undesired calls. See Nadel,
supra note 10, at 109.
28. See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of State Statute or Law Per-
taining to Telephone Solicitation, 44 A.L.R. 5th 619, 627 (1999).
29. Shari A. Kolnicki, Comment, The Telephone Consumer Protection Act and Its Burden on Small Busi-
ness: An Evaluation of the Law and Its Ramifications on Telecommunication Advances, 28 CAP. U. L. REV.
223, 229 (1999) (quoting Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970, 975 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U.S. 77, 88-89 (1949)).
30. Congress concluded as much in 1991, when it found that "[tlhe Constitution does not prohibit restric-
tions on commercial telemarketing solicitations." Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-243, § 2(8), 105 Stat. 2394, 2394.
31. Jennifer L. Radner, Comment, Phone, Fax, and Frustration: Electronic Commercial Speech and Nui-
sance Law, 42 EMORY L.J. 359, 384 (1993),
32. Warren Fiske, A Call To Limit Telemarketers: Lawmakers See More Support for "No-Call" Legisla-
tion, VIRGINIAN-PILOT & LEDGER-STAR (Norfolk, Va.), Jan. 23, 2000, at Al, available in 2000 WL 5109844.
33. Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, § 2(1), 105 Stat. at 2394; see also
Ross D. Petty, Marketing Without Consent: Consumer Choice and Costs, Privacy, and Public Policy, 19 J.
PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 42, 45 (2000) ("[Tlechnological innovations, combined with the lowering of
relative costs of telephoning compared with alternatives such as mass media advertising or door-to-door sales,
have led to invasion of the telephone by marketers and the imposition of attendant costs on consumers.").
34. Congress found that 300 thousand solicitors were engaged in telemarketing in 1990. See Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, § 2(3), 105 Stat. at 2394. In the decade since 1990,
that figure has increase by more than ten times; the telemarketing industry currently provides 3.5 million jobs.
See Fiske, supra note 32.
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telemarketers, consumer groups, Congress, and state legislatures have all tried to address
consumer frustration with unsolicited calls.
A. Voluntary Self-Regulation by the Industry
The Direct Marketing Association (DMA), a New York-based national trade or-
ganization serving the direct marketing field, offers a free service to consumers who
wish to block commercial telephone solicitations. 35 As part of its effort to preempt legis-
lative action in the area of telemarketing, the DMA created the Telephone Preference
Service (TPS). 36 Consumers may write to DMA and ask to be included on the TPS no-
solicitation list,37 which is used by approximately 4800 member businesses nation-
wide. 38 According to DMA lobbyist Pat McHenry, businesses that belong to the DMA
ordinarily heed consumer requests not to be called.39
The DMA's efforts in this area seem logical enough. Many commentators believe it
is in the industry's best interest to avoid calling those consumers who are bothered by
telemarketing calls.4 0 As Professor Nadel points out, "sellers do not have unlimited
amounts of time and telephone calls are not free."4 1 Nevertheless, nothing compels a
particular telemarketing firm to use the TPS list or to honor the wishes of those consum-
ers who have contacted the DMA and asked to be included. According to Nadel, "the
TPS is informally run and compliance is voluntary., 42 The only penalty a DMA member
who ignores consumer requests faces is that of expulsion from the association.43 As
these limitations indicate, the TPS list is an incomplete solution to the unsolicited sales
call explosion.
The incomplete protection that the TPS affords consumers is further evidenced by
the DMA's description of its own service: the DMA asserts only that the TPS will assist
participating consumers in decreasing the number of national commercial calls these
35. See Wheeler, Bill Aims to Disconnect Telephone Solicitors, supra note 5.
36. See Nadel, supra note 10, at 119.
37. See id.; see generally How to Get Off a Telephone List - Consumer Assistance (last modified Feb. 14,
2000) <http://www.the-dma.org/consumers/offtelephonelist.html>.
38. See Wheeler, Bill Aims to Disconnect Telephone Solicitors, supra note 5. Another industry group, the
American Telemarketing Association ("ATA"), also supports the TPS. The ATA recommends that its 1200
members use the TPS no-solicitation list for removing consumers who do not wish to receive telephone solici-
tations. See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND FINANCE, HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND
COMMERCE, 103D CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT CARD ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT OF 1991 BY TOP COMPANIES IN THE TELEMARKETING INDUSTRY 10 (draft Comm. Print
1994), available in Filed Comment of Rep. Markey: Notice Filed in Proceeding 92-90 (received by FCC Dec.
2, 1994) <http://www.fcc.gov/searchtools.html> [hereinafter MAJORITY REPORT].
39. See Wheeler, Bill Aims to Disconnect Telephone Solicitors, supra note 5.
40. See, e.g., Joseph P. Fried, Telemarketers Get an Earful of Rejection, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2000, at
B1, available in LEXIS, News, The New York Times (noting that some telemarketers welcome no-call lists
because they reduce time-wasting calls to people who will be unreceptive to attempts at solicitation).
41. Nadel, supra note 10, at 123.
42. Id. at 120.
43. See Wheeler, Bill Aims to Disconnect Telephone Solicitors, supra note 5.
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consumers receive. 44 The FCC has also recognized this difficulty. According to the
FCC, registration with the DMA should reduce the number of unsolicited calls placed to
a consumer's home, but may not stop all unwanted calls.45 This limitation should be
particularly evident given that the combined membership of the DMA and the American
Telemarketing Association (many of whose members also use the TPS list) includes
only 6000 companies,46 whereas Congress found ten years ago that more than 30,000
businesses engage in telemarketing.4 ' Admittedly, some of these other businesses may
be notified of consumers' wishes to be left alone through the efforts of consumer
groups.
B. The Role of Consumer Groups
A 1994 congressional staff report48 recommended that telemarketers use the do-not-
call list compiled by Private Citizen, Inc. as an edit against their own no-call lists,
49
adding any names to their company's list that appear on Private Citizen's. Private Citi-
zen, the self-described first and largest organization in America specializing in cutting
junk calls and junk mail, maintains a no-solicitation directory and provides consumer
members with a newsletter and information on telemarketing laws.50 The Private Citizen
directory, sent to the headquarters of over 1500 local and national telemarketing firms,
is designed to provide telemarketers with the information they need to avoid calling
people on the list51 in a way that prevents telemarketers from using it as solicitation
list.52 According to Private Citizen, its members report a huge drop in commercial solici-
tation calls.
53
The decrease in sales calls experienced by Private Citizen members could be due, in
part, to the likelihood that most reputable telemarketing firms will honor consumer re-
44. See How To Get Off a Telephone List - Consumer Assistance, supra note 37.
45. See Consumer News: What You Can Do About Unsolicited Telephone Marketing Calls and Faxes
(last modified Oct. 27, 1998) <http://www.fcc.gov/ccb/consumer_news/unsolici.html> [hereinafter Consumer
News].
46. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
47. See Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, § 2(2), 105 Stat. 2394, 2394.
48. See MAJORITY REPORT, supra note 38, at 9.
49. Individual telemarketers, under federal law, must maintain lists of customers who have specifically
requested not to be called. See infra Part III.C (discussing the requirements of the TCPA and the FCC's Tele-
marketing Sales Rule).
50. See Private Citizen, Inc. - Home Page (last modified Mar. 11,2001) <http://www.private-
citizen.com>.
51. See Private Citizen, Inc. - The Do-Not-Call Directory (last modified Mar. 6, 2001)
<http://www.private-citizen.com/directory.htm>.
52. The organization's website suggests that some telemarketers actually use the DMA's TPS list as a so-
licitation tool, which is possible in light of the detailed information consumers must provide to be included on
the TPS list. See The DMA - A.K.A. the Discourteous Marketing Association (last modified Oct. 6, 1998)
<http://www.private-citizen.com/lobby.htm>. Such misuse is potentially prosecutable under the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991 and the Telemarketing Sales Rule. See generally infra Part III.C.
53. See Private Citizen, Inc. - Home Page, supra note 50.
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quests to be left alone.54 For these firms, the simple fact that a consumer has made the
effort to have his or her name listed in a no-solicitation directory such as Private Citi-
zen's is enough to dissuade the firm from calling that consumer. Of course, there is no
guarantee that all telemarketers will cease calling consumers out of kindness alone.
There will always be some telemarketers that give their colleagues a bad name.55 Ac-
cordingly, current federal law 56 provides penalties for telemarketers who fail to heed no-
call requests from specific consumers.57 Private Citizen uses the federal law to its mem-
bers' advantage, providing them with information about their legal rights against intru-
sive telemarketers.55 Apparently, those efforts have been paying off: Private Citizen
members have collected $700,000 in fines and settlements from telemarketers since
1996. 59
While some consumers have been able to block calls from certain telemarketers by
writing to the DMA or joining a group such as Private Citizen,60 these no-call lists have
not been enough to satisfy a public fed up with sales calls. Not every telemarketer, after
all, belongs to the DMA, and not every citizen pays membership dues to Private Citizen.
Even if everyone did belong to Private Citizen, people would continue to receive calls
from telemarketers to whom the organization had not sent directories. Federal legislative
efforts allow consumers to notify telemarketers directly of their desire not to be called,
but, as the next section will show, federal telemarketing laws are not without their
weaknesses.61
54. See, e.g., supra note 39 and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., Nadel, supra note 10, at 120 (citing one telemarketer's concern that "[tihere will always be
sweatshop type operations which will continue to hurt the credibility of the rest of us until the regulators step
in").
56. Private Citizen's compiles its directory with the Telephone Consumer Protection Act in mind; inclu-
sion on the list establishes a member's do-not-call request pursuant to the TCPA. See Private Citizen, Inc. -
The Do-Not-Call Directory, supra note 51.
57. Telemarketers who call an individual within 12 months a do-not-call request may have to pay up to
$500 in damages. If a court finds that a telemarketer willfully or knowingly violated the TCPA, it may award
triple damages of up to $1500. See Robin Leonard, Making Telemarketers Pay You (last modified Mar. 14,
2001) <www.nolo.com/encyclopedia/articles/ctim/nnl99.html>; 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5) (1994).
58. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. The group also offers a book on how to sue telemarketers
at a reduced price to its members. See 'So You Want to Sue a Telemarketer' - A Book by Private Citizen, Inc.
(last modified Dec. 1, 2000) <http://www.private-citizen.com/book.htm>.
59. See Private Citizen, Inc. - Home Page, supra note 50. While Private Citizen compiles a no-call list
and mails it to telemarketers, members themselves are ultimately responsible for prosecuting solicitors who do
not heed their do-not-call requests. See infra Part III.C for discussion of the federal statutes that make this
possible.
60. Getting one's name included in the Private Citizen directory is not free: the organization charges a
$20 membership fee. See Private Citizen, Inc. - Home Page, supra note 50.
61. Private Citizen's website calls the federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 "more silli-
ness than substance" and asserts that "it has so many loop-holes . . . [that] telemarketers can drive a boiler-
room through it." A Consumer's View of TCPA, supra note 27. The Telemarketing Sales Rule, because its
provisions relating to the establishment of do-not-call lists are similar to those of the TCPA, arguably suffers
from the same deficiencies. See generally infra Part III.C.2.
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C. Federal Law on Telemarketing
In 1991, Congress found that consumers were "outraged over the proliferation of in-
trusive... nuisance calls to their homes from telemarketers. ' '62 Since then, the federal
government has taken two significant actions to protect consumer privacy from sales
calls. These forays in federal telemarketing regulation are the TCPA63 and the Federal
Trade Commission's Telemarketing Sales Rule.64 Although the regulations focus on a
number of telemarketing-related problems, 65 both include provisions designed to em-
power consumers who wish to stop repeated calls from individual solicitors.
1. The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991
66
In enacting the TCPA, "Congress took the first significant step in curbing what
many perceived as an onslaught of telemarketing that had invaded American homes. '67
An issue of particular concern at the time was the use of automated, prerecorded tele-
phone calls to private residences. 68 Congress responded by making it a violation of fed-
eral law for any person "to initiate any telephone call to any residential telephone line
using an artificial or prerecorded voice to deliver a message without the prior express
consent of the called party . ,69 While live-operator sales calls are likely just as an-
noying to consumers as prerecorded messages, 70 Congress chose not to impose similar
blanket restrictions on these calls. Instead, it authorized the FCC to initiate a rulemaking
proceeding to determine the best way to protect residential privacy rights from potential
62. Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, § 2(6), 105 Stat. 2394, 2394.
63. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (1994).
64. 16 C.F.R. pt. 310 (2000).
65. The TCPA, for example, regulates the use of automatic telephone dialing systems and unsolicited
facsimiles. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). The Telemarketing Sales Rule includes provisions related to deceptive
telemarketing practices, see 16 C.F.R. § 310.3, and various abusive telemarketing acts, see 16 C.F.R. § 310.4.
Repeatedly calling a consumer who has requested to be placed on a no-call list is only one of the contemplated
abusive acts. See 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1).
66. See Telephone Consumer Protection Act (last modified Jan. 19, 1999)
<http:llwww.fcc.gov/ccb/consumer-news/tcpa.html> for more information, including instructions on where
and how to file complaints; see also FCC Consumer Facts: What You Can Do About Unsolicited Telephone
Marketing Calls and Faxes (last modified Jan. 8, 2001)
<http://www.fcc.gov/cib/consumerfacts/Nofaxes.html>.
67. Miller & Biggerstaff, supra note 4, at 668.
68. According to the congressional findings accompanying the TCPA, Congress determined that tele-
phone subscribers "considered automated or prerecorded telephone calls ... to be a nuisance and an invasion
of privacy." Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, § 2(10), 105 Stat. 2394,2394.
69. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B) (1994). Exceptions to the prohibition on using prerecorded messages in-
clude instances when the third party has consented to receiving the message, there is an emergency, or the
FCC creates an exemption pursuant to its rulemaking authority under the statute. See id.
70. As one author put it, "[Il]ittle has been done to restrict the practice of live operators calling private
residences. While recorded messages may be deemed a particularly insidious annoyance, the individual's
privacy interest is no less invaded if the operator is live." Cox, supra note 6, at 404.
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infringement by these objectionable calls. 71
The TCPA gave the FCC discretion to consider a number of methods and proce-
dures for regulating live-operator unsolicited sales calls. These options included, but
were not limited to, "the use of electronic databases, telephone network technologies,
special directory markings, [and] industry-based or company-specific 'do-not-call' sys-
tems .... 7 Congress specifically left open the possibility that the FCC might require
the creation of a single national database "to compile a list of telephone numbers of
residential subscribers who object to receiving telephone solicitations . . . .,7 ulti-
mately, the FCC declined to adopt this potential solution, opting instead to require that
individual telemarketers keep their own lists of consumers who request not to be
called.74 Under current federal law, a person or entity engaged in telemarketing "must
maintain a record of a caller's request not to receive future telephone solicitations" and
honor that request for ten years.75 Those making telephone solicitations must have a
written policy, available on demand, for maintaining their do-not-call lists. 76 Further-
more, businesses must train their personnel about the existence and use of such lists. 77 A
telemarketer's failure to follow these requirements may subject him to suit under the
TCPA.
The TCPA provides two remedies: a private right of action and a state right of ac-
tion. Under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3), individuals may sue telemarketers in state court to
recover actual damages or receive up to $500 in damages for each violation, whichever
is greater.78 Treble damages for knowing or willful violations are also available at a
court's discretion. 79 Nevertheless, to recover at all, an individual must usually receive
two calls from the same telemarketer within a twelve-month period. 80 Even if the same
71. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(1).
72. Id. § 227(c)(1)(A).
73. Id. § 227(c)(3).
74. According to Andrew Barrett, who was Commissioner of the FCC in 1992, "the current record clearly
supports the company-specific do-not call lists as the most effective, most easily implemented and the least
costly of the methods proposed to curb unwanted telephone solicitations." In re Rules and Regulations Imple-
menting the Tel. Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 7 F.C.C.R. 8752, 8794 (1992) (statement of Comm'r
Andrew C. Barrett).
75. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e)(2)(vi) (2000).
76. See id. § 64.1200(e)(2)(i) ("Persons or entities making telephone solicitations must have a written
policy, available upon demand, for maintaining a do-not-call list.").
77. See id. § 64.1200(e)(2)(ii) ("Personnel engaged in any aspect of telephone solicitation must be in-
formed and trained in the existence and use of the do-not-call list.").
78. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) (1994) (A person or entity may bring in state court "an action to recover
for actual monetary loss from such a violation, or to receive $500 in damages for each such violation, which-
ever is greater ... ").
79. See id. § 227(b)(3) ("If the court finds that the defendant willfully or knowingly violated this subsec-
tion or the regulations prescribed under this subsection, the court may, at its own discretion, increase the
amount of the award to an amount equal to not more than 3 times the amount available under [§
227(b)(3)(B)].").
80. See id. § 227(c)(5) ("A person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12-month
period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection may..
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entity contacts a consumer twice in violation of his request not to be called, the TCPA
may provide an affirmative defense for the offending telemarketer. According to §
227(c)(5)(C), a telemarketer may escape liability if "the defendant has established and
implemented, with due care, reasonable practices and procedures to effectively prevent
telephone solicitations in violation of the regulations prescribed" by the TCPA.81 Similar
provisions apply to the authority of state attorneys general to sue telemarketers on behalf
of state residents. Whenever a state attorney general "has reason to believe that any
person has engaged.., in ... a pattern or practice of telephone calls ... in violation of
[the TCPA], the State may bring a civil action" for an injunction, actual damages, or
both in a federal district court.82
The federal limitations on telemarketing made possible by the TCPA are useful, but
the law is far from ideal from the standpoint of many consumers. According to one au-
thor, there are two key difficulties with the statute: "First, most people are uninformed.
They are unaware of 'do-not-call' lists and ... do not know how to protect themselves.
[Second], even citizens who are aware of the lists and who request to be put on them
will be bothered at least once by every telemarketer. ' ' 83 Similar limitations are contained
in another recent federal attempt to control telemarketing abuses, the Federal Trade
Commission's Telemarketing Sales Rule.
84
2. The Telemarketing Sales Rule
85
In 1994, Congress found that interstate telemarketing fraud had become such a
problem that the resources of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) were not sufficient
to ensure adequate protection to consumers. 86 By enacting the Telemarketing and Con-
sumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act,87 Congress hoped to offer consumers necessary
safeguards from telemarketing deception and abuse. 88 To this end, the Act empowered
the FTC to prescribe rules prohibiting abusive telemarketing acts or practices.89 Con-
[bring an action in state court] . ). In essence, telemarketers have to ignore a consumer's request not to be
called again twice within the same year before they will be subject to liability under the TCPA.
81. Id. § 227(c)(5).
82. Id. § 227(f)(1).
83. Cox, supra note 6, at 424.
84. 16 C.F.R. pt. 310 (2000).
85. See Telemarketing Sales Rule (last modified August 22, 2000)
<http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/rulemaking/tsr/index.html> for more information, including tips on compliance.
Unlike the TCPA, the Telemarketing Sales Rule focuses primarily upon telemarketing fraud. Nevertheless, the
provisions relating to maintenance of do-not-call lists are strikingly similar to those provided in the TCPA and
the subsequent FCC regulations under that statute.
86. See Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-297, § 2, 108
Stat. 1545, 1545 (1994) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6101(2) (1994)).
87. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6108 (1994).
88. See Pub. L. No. 103-297, § 2(5), 108 Stat. at 1545.
89. See 15 U.S.C. § 6102(a)(1) ("The [Federal Trade] Commission shall prescribe rules prohibiting decep-
tive telemarketing acts or practices and other abusive telemarketing acts or practices.").
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gress specifically called on the FTC to include in its rules "a requirement that telemar-
keters may not undertake a pattern of unsolicited telephone calls which the reasonable
consumer would consider coercive or abusive of such consumer's right to privacy.
'" 90
The FTC responded by adopting the Telemarketing Sales Rule ("the Rule"). 9'
The Rule regulates a number of fraudulent activities by telemarketers-one of
which is a pattern of abusive calls. 92 According to the FTC, it is an abusive telemarket-
ing practice to initiate an outbound telephone call to a person who has stated that he or
she does not wish to receive calls from the seller.93 Similar to the TCPA,94 the Rule
provides an affirmative defense for telemarketers who accidentally call those consumers
who have expressed a desire not to be contacted. A seller is not liable for a Rule viola-
tion if it has (1) established and implemented written procedures to comply with do-not-
call requests, (2) properly trained its personnel, (3) maintained its list to comply with the
law, and (4) subsequently called the consumer in error.
95
Assuming that a telemarketing entity cannot prove that it has satisfied the require-
ments of the affirmative defense, it faces potential liability to either a state attorney gen-
eral or a private citizen who files notice with the FTC and sues in court.96 The conse-
quences of non-compliance can be costly: according to the FTC, the fine for calling a
consumer who has previously requested not to be called may reach $10,000 per viola-
tion.97
While both the TCPA and the Rule do allow consumers to recover-sometimes
handsomely-from telemarketers who refuse to stop calling, these regulations are not
the only limitations on unwanted solicitation calls. The states have also adopted a num-
ber of different restrictions on the telemarketing industry.
D. State Telemarketing Laws
Due to a savings clause within the TCPA, states retain the authority to regulate tele-
90. Id. § 6102(a)(3)(A).
91. See Alison Garfinkel, Telemarketing Compliance in the Year 2000: How to Make Cold-Call Solicita-
tions and Stay Within the Law, WSTA TICKER, July/Aug. 1999, available in WSTA Article - August 1999 (last
modified Aug. 31, 1999) <http://gateway2.callcompliance.com/WSTA.htm> (noting that the Telemarketing
Sales Rule is "often referred to as 'The Rule').
92. Also included in the Telemarketing Sales Rule are provisions regulating credit card laundering, see
16 C.F.R. § 310.3(c), threats and intimidation, 'see id. § 310.4(a)(1), telemarketers' failure to disclose certain
information, see id. § 310.4(d), and the hours during which telemarketers may contact consumers at their
homes, see id. § 310.4(c).
93. See id. § 310.4(b) ("It is an abusive telemarketing act ...for a telemarketer to engage in ...
[i]nitiating an outbound telephone call to a person ... that... previously has stated he or she does not wish to
receive an outbound telephone call made by... the seller whose goods or services are being offered.").
94. Under the TCPA, "[i]t is an affirmative defense ... that the defendant has established and imple-
mented, with due care, reasonable practices and procedures to effectively prevent telephone solicitations in
violation of the regulations ..." 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5) (1994); see supra note 81 and accompanying text.
95. See 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(2).
96. See id. § 310.7(a).
97. See Garfinkel, supra note 91.
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telemarketing within their borders. The clause provides that nothing in the TCPA "shall
preempt any State law that imposes more restrictive intrastate requirements or regula-
tions on, or which prohibits... the making of telephone solicitations. '98 This provision
has not gone unnoticed: according to one source, "[1]egislation and regulation of the
industry at the state level is coming at a frightning [sic] pace."99 More than 150 bills
designed to regulate telemarketing were introduced during the first half of 1999 alone.
00
Although a handful of states have taken the dramatic step of creating statewide data-
bases that contain the names and phone numbers of consumers who object to receiving
telemarketing calls,' 01 most state laws are probably less objectionable to the telemarket-
ing industry.'
0 2
The typical state statute contains regulations similar to those present at the federal
level. For example, many require telemarketers to maintain their own (company-
specific) do-not-call lists of those consumers who have specifically asked them not to
call again.' 0 3 Others force solicitors to hang up promptly if a consumer voices disinterest
in continuing the conversation.' ° 4 At least one state directs telemarketers to obtain and
utilize the DMA's TPS no-call list, 10 5 a proposal that has also been made at the federal
level. 10 6 As is the case with federal law, these state statutes provide little comfort to
"irate consumers, [who can only] shield their homes from unwanted calls by canceling
one company at a time."'1 7 Accordingly, state legislatures have been considering-and
some have passed-legislation forbidding telemarketers to call consumers whose names
appear in statewide no-solicitation databases of one kind or another.' 08 Part IV of this
Note attempts a lengthier examination of such laws, which many Americans may find
appealing in today's era of telemarketing expansion.
E. The Inadequacy of Current Remedies
Now that telemarketing has become the largest piece of the direct marketing indus-
try and is expected to grow by eight to ten percent annually through the twenty-first
century,'0 9 it is hardly surprising that numerous states and the federal government have
98. 47 U.S.C. § 227(e)(1) (1994).
99. Garfinkel, supra note 91.
100. See id.
101. See infra PartIV.B.
102. For a relatively recent, state-by-state listing of telemarketing regulations, see List of State Legisla-
tion (visited Mar. 20, 2001) <http://gateway2.callcompliance.com/statelist.asp>.
103. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 86-1212 (1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1499 (West 1997);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-61-3.5 (1999); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-445 (West Supp. 2000).
104. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-670 (1994 & Supp. 1999); MISS. CODE ANN. § 77-3-603 (1999).
105. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1498 (West 1997 & Supp. 2000).
106. See Majority Report, supra note 38, at 9.
107. Fiske, supra note 32.
108. See infra Part IV.B.
109. See Leslie Gornstein, Turning the Tables: Savvy Consumers Use Regulations to Ring Up Court
Awards Against Telephone Marketers, FT. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Dec. 8, 1996, at 1 (citing DMA esti-
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considered adopting do-not-call legislation to protect consumer privacy from telemar-
keters. Few would dispute that those engaged in the business have a right to pursue their
trade; nevertheless, many consumers report that they have been overwhelmed by the
recent flood of sales calls to their homes.110 While the past decade has seen a number of
private organizations and legislative bodies attempt to address consumer concerns, most
of these efforts have proven unsuccessful or incomplete. According to one commentator,
The existing regulations do not absolve the evils inherent to any kind of telemarket-
ing: the uninvited solicitors can get you while you are sleeping, when you are shower-
ing, when you are eating dinner, or during your favorite television show. They can
wake your baby and they can get you even if you have an unlisted number."'
Moreover, despite the highly intrusive nature of telemarketing calls," 2 homeowners
cannot escape the nuisance of sales calls as easily as other forms of direct marketing
solicitation." 3 Do-not-call laws-the focus of the remainder of this Note-offer a poten-
tially effective remedy to these problems.
IV. Do-NOT-CALL LEGISLATION
As discussed supra, the Supreme Court has indicated that homeowners may protect
themselves from unwanted door-to-door canvassers by erecting "no solicitors" signs on
their property. 4 Nevertheless, if a traveling salesman encounters such a sign outside a
home, he may contact the inhabitant by simply dialing up that residence on a cellular
phone from across the street instead." 5 This discrepancy led one commentator to con-
clude that "[t]elemarketing should be banned until technology is available to put 'no
solicitation' sign on your phone number as well."
'"16
, Although hardly a technological advance, the enactment of no-call legislation may
permit just what was has been suggested-placement of virtual "no solicitation" signs
on those phone numbers included in a centrally-stored, globally-utilized database." 7 The
mates), available in Leslie Gomstein, Savvy Consumers Use Regulations to Ring Up Court Awards Against
Telemarketers (visited Mar. 20, 2001) <http://consumer.net/telemarketing/savvy.asp>.
110. See, e.g., supra note 8 and accompanying text.
111. Cox, supra note 6, at 424.
112. See Nadel, supra note 10, at 103 (explaining that "[u]nsolicited calls are intrinsically more intrusive
than mail and other forms of visual communication" because they reach the individual in her home and are
aural rather than visual).
113. See, e.g., supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text; infra note 216 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
115. See Cox, supra note 6, at 424. This assumes that the homeowner has not already asked that sales-
man or his company not to contact her through one of the channels discussed in supra Part III.
116. Cox, supra note 6, at 424.
117. According to Missouri Att'y Gen. Jay Nixon, "[e]ver since the founding of this country you've been
able to put a no-trespassing sign on your property .... With the invention of telemarketing, that no-trespassing
zone no longer includes your dinner table." Craig Savoye, States Spare Residents from Telemarketers,
CHRISTIAN SCL MONITOR, Dec. 22, 2000, at 2, available in 2000 WL 4433175. Missouri's new no-call law,
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basic idea behind do-not-call statutes is to allow consumers a preemptive strike against
telemarketers, to permit them to notify practically all potential telephone solicitors"
8
that their calls are not welcome before those calls can be made. While states are begin-
ning to pass do-not-call laws,1 9 the FCC has-thus far-been unwilling to adopt a na-
tional database approach.1
20
A. Debate Over a National Do-Not-Call Database
The idea of implementing a national no-call list goes a step beyond current federal
regulations, which generally allow telemarketers to make an initial contact with a con-
sumer-at which time the consumer may ask to be placed on that telemarketer's in-
house no-call list. According to the FCC, each time a consumer receives a call from a
different person or entity, the consumer must request that person or entity not call
again. 121 While this may not please proponents of global "no solicitation" signs for tele-
phones, the FCC has concluded that establishment of a national do-not-call database is
"not an efficient, effective, or economic means of avoiding unwanted telephone solicita-
tions."
12 2
1. The FCC's Argument Against National Do-Not-Call Regulations
The FCC explained its rationale for opposing a national do-not-call database in the
report accompanying its 1992 order implementing the TCPA. l2 3 According to that re-
port, a majority of commentators do not favor the national database option because it
would be "costly and difficult to establish and maintain."' 124 Commentators estimated
that initial implementation of the database would cost between $20 million and $80
million; moreover, maintenance could cost another $20 million each year thereafter.
25
As the TCPA does not allow consumers to foot the bill for any regulations the FCC may
however, enables Missouri residents the option of putting a "no trespassing" sign around their dinner tables.
See Bill Bell Jr., Missourians May Sign Up for No-Call List to Block Some Telemarketers, ST. Louis POST-
DISPATCH, Dec. 14, 2000, at BI, available in 2000 WL 3566312.
118. Subject, of course, to any class of telemarketers exempted by a particular law.
119. See Telephony, COMM. DAILY, Jan. 3, 2001, available in 2001 WL 5052285 ("To date, 9 states have
put no-call list laws into effect - Ala., Alaska, Ark., Conn., Fla., Ga., Ky., Ore., Tenn. In addition, Ida., Mo.,
and N.Y. will be putting no-call laws passed in their 2000 legislative sessions into effect by midyear."). See
infra Part IV.B for a discussion of state-based do-not-call laws.
120. See infra Part IV.A. 1.
121. See Consumer News, supra note 45 (providing a good overview of federal telemarketing regulations
and consumers' rights under federal law).
122. In re Rules & Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 7 F.C.C.R.
8752, 8761 (1992).
123. See generally id. at 8758-61 (examining the national database approach).
124. Id. at 8758. The appendix to the FCC's report lists the parties who filed comments with the Com-
mission during the rulemaking proceeding, the vast majority of whom were companies that engage in telemar-
keting. See id. at 8785-89.
125. See id. (citing comments of AT&T).
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adopt to implement the Act, 126 businesses would initially be forced to shoulder these
substantial costs. This, the report notes, could severely disadvantage small businesses,
which might not be able to afford to participate in a national database. 127 Ultimately,
consumers could end up bearing the costs of a national database, either because telemar-
keters would charge correspondingly higher prices or because taxpayers would be forced
to subsidize any difference between the cost of the database and the fees that the data-
base administrator actually collects from telemarketers.128 These financial concerns were
not all the FCC cited to support its decision against establishing a national do-not-call
list.
In addition to the difficulty it foresaw in financing a national database, the FCC
worried that consumers would be unhappy with the final result. Numerous commenta-
tors, the FCC's report noted, argue that consumers would be disappointed if they signed
up for the database but continued to receive sales calls. 129 This result would be possible
if there were any lag between the time a consumer made her do-not-call request and
when telemarketers received an updated copy of the national directory.' 30 Furthermore,
consumers would continue to receive calls from organizations exempted from using the
database,13 1 such as a not-for-profit groups or political campaigns. 32 Just as some con-
sumers might be dissatisfied that they could not block all telemarketing calls by signing
onto the list, others might not like having to make the all-or-nothing choice that doing so
would entail. Citing comments by the DMA, the FCC report notes that consumers would
have to "either reject all telemarketing calls, even those which the consumer might like
to receive, or accept all telemarketing calls, including those which the consumer does
not wish to receive."' 33 Finally, the report indicates, commentators have questioned
whether a widely-accessible national database would offer sufficient privacy protections
for telephone subscribers. Some believe a database might be misused to compile solici-
tation lists. 134 This would not only defeat the purpose of the database, but would "de-
126. See id. at 8760 n.23 (noting that 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(2) prohibits any alternative which would charge
residential subscribers a fee for participation).
127. See id. at 8758 (citing comments of Securities Industry Association). Commentators suggest that a
small business would either have to invest in computer hardware and software (if the list were computerized)
or hire additional personnel to review paper versions of the national list (if the list were distributed in hard-
copy). See id. (citing comments of National Retail Federation).
128. See In re Rules & Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 7 F.C.C.R.
8753, 8758 (1992).
129. See id. at 8758 (citing comments of SafeCard Services, Inc. and Sprint).
130. See id. Quarterly or semiannual updates, some commentators have said, would be too infrequent to
avoid obsolescence or satisfy consumer expectations. See id. at 8759 (citing comments of Sprint).
131. See id. at 8758-59 (citing comments of SafeCard and Sprint).
132. See, e.g., Wheeler, Bill Aims to Disconnect Telephone Solicitors, supra note 5 (noting that politi-
cians and charities are exempt from any limitations because "[c]ourts have ruled that they have a constitutional
right to call and ask for your money or your vote").
133. In re Rules & Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 7 F.C.C.R. at
8759 (citing comments of Direct Marketing Association).
134. See In re Rules & Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 7 F.C.C.R.
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stroy the confidentiality of subscribers having unpublished or unlisted numbers."'' 35
After what it called "careful consideration of the costs and benefits of creating a
national do-not-call database," the FCC concluded that the disadvantages of doing so
outweighed any possible advantages.' 36 Rather than implementing a system that might
threaten small businesses and burden consumers, the FCC settled on a less radical solu-
tion. The company-specific do-not-call list alternative, the FCC decided, "is the most
effective and efficient means to permit telephone subscribers to avoid unwanted tele-
phone solicitations."'137 A 1994 congressional report, however, took issue with this con-
clusion and called on the FCC to reexamine its decision against the background of new
congressional findings and increasing calls from consumers for a national database.1
38
2. A Dissenting View from Congress
One year after passage of the TCPA, a House subcommittee asked over fifty of the
nation's largest telemarketing companies to provide detailed information on what inter-
nal steps they had taken regarding implementation of the Act and the FCC's regula-
tions. 139 After reviewing industry responses, the majority staff of the House Committee
on Energy and Commerce's Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance con-
cluded that industry compliance with the TCPA was generally "poor and extremely
inconsistent."'' 40 In addition to suggesting that the FCC give serious consideration to
fine-tuning its rules to make them more consumer-friendly, the subcommittee report
recommended the maintenance of a national do-not-call list. 14
According to the report, after the FCC's rules were adopted, constituents continued
to write to their elected representatives to complain about the nuisance of unwanted
telemarketing calls. Americans asked their congressmen to support legislation that
would establish a national do-not-call system, rather than company-specific lists.' 42 "A
national database allowing consumers to sign up only once while requiring telemar-
keters to match their list regularly with it," according to subcommittee staff, "would be
more foolproof, remedy weaknesses, and close loopholes in the TCPA.' ' 143 While indus-
try groups raised various arguments against such a database during the FCC's imple-
mentation proceedings, the subcommittee staff determined that company-specific lists
did not constitute "as effective an alternative to a national database ... as it was origi-
8752, 8759 (1992) (citing comments of Consumer Bankers Association).
135. Id. (citing comments of J.C. Penney Company, Inc.).
136. Id. at 8760.
137. Id. at 8765.
138. See MAJORrrY REPORT, supra note 38, at 16.
139. See id. at 2.
140. Id. at4.
141. See id. at 14.
142. See id. at 14-15.
143. Id. at 16.
2001]
Journal of Legislation
nally contended they would be."' 44
The subcommittee staff based its conclusion, in part, on what it called the "inade-
quate or nonexistent" written do-not-call policies and training materials of numerous
telemarketers. 145 A uniform national policy, the report concluded, could replace an "in-
effective policy of company-specific [do-not-call lists] and help reduce a continuing
chorus of consumer complaints about an industry of vital importance to the American
economy." 1
46
3. Evaluating the Arguments
Disagreements such as those between the FCC and congressional staff are typical
with respect to telemarketing law. There is a sharp divide in opinion over whether
adopting a database approach-or even a less-restrictive solution-would unduly ham-
per legitimate businesses. Texas State Representative Frank Corte Jr., for example, ar-
gues that legislation to set up a do-not-call database in Texas "would impede free enter-
prise and increase business costs that will be passed on to consumers." 147 Supporters,
Corte continues, ignore that it would be simpler to hang up the phone: '"They want gov-
ernment to do those little things we should do for ourselves."" 148 Not everyone feels this
way. 149 On the other side of the chasm are those arguing for enhanced consumer privacy
protections-of a type that could severely restrict the industry. According to one author,
"[t]he telephone does not need to be used as a vehicle for advertising. Alternative, tradi-
tional means of advertising are available and the vast majority of those companies utiliz-
ing telemarketing will survive without it.' 50 Most people's sentiments likely fall some-
where in between hard-line pro-business stance and the idea that telemarketing should
be banned in the interest of protecting consumer privacy.
A common view was recently voiced by Harvey Morgan, a member of the Virginia
House of Delegates: "It's maddening for people to get all these calls that always seem to
come at dinner time, and I'd love to be able to do something about it, but it has to be a
reasonable measure."'' 5 According to Morgan, "[t]he telemarketing lobby has made
144. Id.
145. Id. at 24.
146. Id.
147. Scott S. Greenberger, No-Call List Gets House Approval, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, May 11, 1999,
at B 1, available in 1999 WL 7412093.
148. Id. (quoting Rep. Corte). But see Radner, supra note 31, at 386 ("The ringing telephone is an ines-
capable disturbance unless one wishes to unplug the phone or turn off the ringer; the first option denies one
complete use of the phone .... and the second prevents desired calls from coming in.").
149. See, e.g., Marjie Lundstrom, State Bill Would Help Us Say: Bye-Bye, MCI!, Scripps Howard News
Service, Jan. 11, 2001, available in LEXIS, News, Scripps Howard News Service ("It is arrogant to suggest
that simply hanging up on unwanted telemarketers is a one-size-fits-all solution. For the Miss Manners adher-
ents among us, hanging up on virtually anyone is not an option.").
150. Cox, supra note 6, at 423. Cox supports the imposition of a wholesale ban on telemarketing. See su-
pro note 116 and accompanying text.
151. Fiske, supra note 32.
[Vol. 27:2
Combating Unsolicited Sales Calls
some persuasive arguments against this type of legislation."' 5 2 That telemarketers have
vociferously challenged the establishment of a national do-not-call database is undeni-
able. '53 Whether their arguments are persuasive in anything more than a purely political
sense, however, seems far less certain.' 54 This section examines the arguments that op-
ponents of do-not-call legislation have advanced and attempts to determine whether free
enterprise interests outweigh consumer protection concerns in this area.
Database opponents worry that do-not-call legislation is ill-conceived because it
would be costly and restrict the ability of businesses to make first-time contacts with
potential consumers. It would, opponents believe, force consumers to decide whether
they wanted to receive all telemarketing calls or no telephone solicitations-with no
room for consumer choice between the two extremes. A large no-solicitation list could
be unmanageable and might quickly become outdated. Furthermore, its opponents say, it
would threaten consumer privacy and disappoint people who expect such legislation to
block all telemarketing calls. Finally, some industry sources argue, a do-not-call data-
base is unnecessary because telemarketing is valuable to consumers as well as busi-
nesses. While the do-not-call solution may not be a perfect one, many of the arguments
against it are hardly compelling-especially those that maintain that consumers value
telemarketing.
a. The value of telemarketing to consumers
There is no question that telemarketing is valuable to the businesses who employ
this sales method. One need only look at the industry's sales figures-over $600 billion
annually-to determine this much. 155 Industry lobbyists, however, argue that consumers
consider it valuable as well. "Sure, some people don't like to receive telemarketing
calls," one industry source said, "but it's obviously valuable to consumers. There are a
lot of people out there who are buying."' 5 6 Nevertheless, that some people do purchase
152. Id.
153. See, e.g., Archived Issue Briefs: Privacy Issues (Jan. 2000) <http://www.the-
dma.org/cgi/issuearchive> [hereinafter Privacy Issues] (noting that the DMA lobbies actively in every state
where do-not-call legislation is under consideration for the position that no-call lists are "redundant and un-
necessary in light of federal law and industry self-regulation").
154. See, e.g., The DMA - A.K.A. the Discourteous Marketing Association, supra note 52. Private Citizen
has called the TCPA "the best law telemarketing firms could buy," noting further that the DMA and its mem-
bers give millions to state and federal legislators to help assure that no effective laws are passed. Id. The
TCPA, Private Citizen's web site says, "was attacked by the DMA and its members so successfully that a US
House Subcommittee majority staff report found that the resulting law and regulations were actually counter-
productive to consumer privacy." Id.
155. See supra note 3. Nevertheless, the majority of this revenue is derived from consumer-initiated calls
to businesses. See Petty, supra note 33, at 45 (noting that "70% of all telemarketing revenues are generated
from consumer-initiated calls, not from marketer-initiated calls").
156. Fiske, supra note 32 (quoting Tyler Prochnow, attorney for the American Teleservice Association).
But see Fried, supra note 40 (quoting New York Governor George E. Pataki's concern that "telemarketers
often dupe consumers into buying products they don't want or can't afford").
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goods and services from telemarketers does not change the fact that many consumers are
fed up with sales calls.' 57 The DMA calls consumer antipathy toward telemarketers the
"'leave me alone' syndrome" and notes that it is spreading. 158 At least twenty-seven
states were expected to consider do-not-call legislation in 2000.159
While proponents of no-call legislation can find plenty of people willing to provide
testimonials, 60 telemarketing lobbyists are made to infer from telemarketing sales that
people favor telephone solicitation. Perhaps there are American consumers who like to
receive sales calls.' 61 Assuming that is true, the esteem in which consumers hold tele-
marketers is not altogether relevant to the creation of a do-not-call database. There is no
indication, for example, that the existence of a database would preclude telemarketers
from reaching people who value telephone solicitations. Several states have already
enacted do-not-call legislation and allow consumers, on a voluntary basis, to include
their numbers in state databases. One need not jump to the conclusion that all those resi-
dents who have not signed up particularly value telemarketing; however, that many
people have is probably good evidence that they do not value sales calls. Moreover, the
fact that inclusion in a no-call database is voluntary also illustrates the frailty of a related
argument against do-not-call legislation-the all-or-nothing decision concern.
b. Stopping all sales calls v. stopping none
If telemarketers had their way, restrictions on their businesses would be no harsher
than those already imposed by the FCC. They note that current federal law empowers
consumers to decide which calls to accept and which calls not to accept. 62 No-call laws,
the industry argues, are troublesome because they "force people into an all-or-nothing
decision.' 63 Such reasoning once again fails to account for the fact that consumers need
not sign onto a no-call list. If company-specific do-not-call lists are as effective as in-
dustry sources claim, the existence of national or statewide databases should not concern
157. See, e.g., supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
158. Privacy Issues, supra note 153.
159. See id.
160. See, e.g., Fiske, supra note 32 (relaying the experience of Virginia State Sen. Leslie Byrne, who re-
ceived a spontaneous ovation at a town hall meeting after telling constituents about a state do-not-call pro-
posal).
161. See, e.g., Betsy Cahill, South Dakota Fraud Squad Offers Tips To Avoid Telemarketing Scams,
ABERDEEN AM. NEWS (S.D.), Dec. 13, 2000, available in 2000 WL 30570726 (noting that, while he might be
one of the very few, Chris Weseloh, business manager of an Aberdeen-based telemarketing firm, claims to like
receiving telemarketing calls); supra note 4 (noting that 1% of the population likes to get telemarketing calls).
If telemarketers' claims that American consumers really do like sales calls are to be taken seriously, however,
it might help the industry's cause to solicit comments from average Americans, rather than telemarketing
executives.
162. See Fiske, supra note 32. To illustrate this point of view, Fiske quoted Tyler Prochnow, who argued
that current law would allow a homeowner to decide that he wanted to receive calls from lawn companies, but
not banks. See id.
163. Id. (quoting Tyler Prochnow); see also supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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telemarketers. Those consumers that want to hear from lawn care companies but not
banks, for example, could simply decline'to register for a database and continue to fol-
low the current system. 16 4 If a bank called, consumers could ask that bank to place them
on its own do-not-call list; if a lawn care company phoned, they could do business.
Given that no-call legislation increases consumer options to select who may (or may
not) call them, one might wonder what is truly worrying the telemarketing industry. The
answer is likely that Americans, in large numbers, might consciously choose not to re-
ceive any sales calls at all. The congressional report discussed supra foreshadowed as
much. According to subcommittee staff,
consumers resent being forced to tell each and every telemarketer who calls not to call
back. The high number of names on "in-house" lists ... not only debunks industry
arguments that "some ... consumers view such calls as an annoyance," or that con-
sumers really do not mind being bothered at all, but also indicates strong interest in a
national [do-not-call list]. 165
According to the report, anecdotal evidence demonstrates that consumers are look-
ing for just the sort of global exemption from sales calls that telemarketers suggest peo-
ple would find unacceptable. 166 Probably because they realize how attractive the pros-
pect of joining a nationwide do-not-call database would be to many Americans, some
telemarketing interests put forth a different argument. They warn that a national data-
base would be unmanageable and would quickly become outdated.
c. Database obsolescence
Database opponents note that one-fifth of all telephone numbers change each
year. 167 Accordingly, they argue, any do-not-call database "would be continuously obso-
lete and would require constant updates in order to remain accurate."'' 68 Semiannual or
even quarterly updates would be too infrequent to rectify this problem and, hence,
would not accommodate consumer expectations, the industry explains. 169 While it is
probably true that requests to be included in a database could not be carried out immedi-
ately-unlike company-specific do-not-call requests-this is hardly a persuasive argu-
ment in favor of rejecting the database approach. The use by some telemarketers of the
164. Cf supra note 162. No one suggests that adoption of a database approach would necessitate the re-
peal of current regulations requiring telemarketers to keep their own do-not-call lists. Furthermore, even if the
FCC were to withdraw these rules, telemarketers would be perfectly within their rights to continue to use such
lists voluntarily.
165. MAJoRrrY REPORT, supra note 38, at 12.
166. See id. at 8-9.
167. See In re Rules & Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 7 F.C.C.R.
8752, 8759 (1992) (citing comments of AT&T).
168. Id.
169. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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DMA's no-solicitation list 70 would seem to raise the same issues of timeliness and ob-
solescence because the DMA only updates the TPS list on a quarterly basis as well.
71
People do move and change their phone numbers; some might even decide to re-
move their number from a do-not-call database. 172 Despite such realities, a mandatory
statewide or national do-not-call list would be no more outdated than the DMA's list or
even a local telephone directory. Even if a national database were only updated once
each year, like a telephone book, opponents only argue that twenty percent of the num-
bers included would be outdated. 173 Eighty percent of database participants, therefore,
would experience no such problems in a given year. Given the choice between a do-not-
call system with this level of effectiveness and a company-specific system that requires
consumers to notify every company not to call them individually, it would seem that
Americans prefer the former approach. 174 While they may admit that the database ap-
proach appeals to consumers in theory, however, industry sources argue that the reality
of such a system would prove disappointing to people who signed up for a do-not-call
list but did not succeed in blocking all sales calls to their homes.
d. Incomplete relief
A common refrain from those opposed to the creation of a mandatory do-not-call
system is that it would backfire when consumers find that it does not stop all telemarket-
ing calls from reaching them. 175 John Astle, a Maryland State Senator, justified his re-
cent vote to kill a no-call measure in his state on the basis that such legislation would
"'create a false expectation in people's minds"' that telemarketers would no longer
bother them. 176 People would "'still be getting lots of calls,"' he said, "because charities
and politicians are constitutionally exempt from any restrictions on their fund-raising
efforts and other exemptions were written into the measure."'
177
170. See supra text accompanying notes 35-38.
171. Both the DMA's Telephone Preference Service and do-not-call databases operate on the same gen-
eral principle: a consumer who does not wish to receive additional telemarketing calls contacts an agency or
organization and asks that her name be added to a no-solicitation list. In the case of the TPS, the DMA updates
its file four times each year and then makes it available to telemarketers who choose to use it. See How to Get
Off a Telephone List - Consumer Assistance, supra note 37.
172. See In re Rules & Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 7 F.C.C.R.
at 8759 (noting that "AT&T states that a national database would contain millions of names and addresses, and
that at least 20 percent of those would change ever year as people move, change telephone numbers, discon-
nect service, or simply decide to enter or leave the database").
173. See supra notes 167, 172 and accompanying text.
174. See, e.g., supra note 142 and accompanying text.
175. See Wheeler, Curb on Telemarketers Dies in Senate Panel; 'Do-Not-Call' List Opposed by Busi-
ness, BAIT. SUN, Feb. 23, 2000, at lB, available in 2000 WL 4859072 [hereinafter Wheeler, Curb on Tele-
marketers Dies in Senate Panel]; see also supra notes 129, 131-32 and accompanying text.
176. Wheeler, Curb on Telemarketers Dies in Senate Panel, supra note 175. Sen. Astle voted against the
Maryland no-call bill even though he had been one of its co-sponsors, citing fears that it would create false
expectations in the minds of consumers. See id.
177. Id. Astle thought people would be angered by the false perception as they continued to receive calls
[Vol. 27:2
Combating Unsolicited Sales Calls
Do-not-call legislation enacted in other states also exempts various non-profit and
businesses organizations. 178 An extreme example of this practice is Kentucky's no-call
law, 17 9 which has been estimated to exempt ninety-five percent of all businesses or non-
profit organizations that conduct telemarketing sales within that state. 180 The Kentucky
statute, however, is atypical among state do-not-call laws.
A stronger state statute is Florida's, which reportedly eliminates seventy to eighty
percent of sales calls in the Sunshine State. 18 1 Section 501.059 of the Florida Statutes
provides that "[n]o telephone solicitor shall make or cause to be made any unsolicited
telephonic sales call to any residential ... number if the number for that telephone ap-
pears in the then-current quarterly listing published by the [Department of Agriculture
and Consumer Services].' 82 The law includes only a handful of exemptions. Included
among them are calls made: (1) in response to an express request to be called, (2) in
connection with an existing debt or contract, (3) to any person with whom the solicitor
has a prior or existing busihess relationship, or (4) by a, newspaper publisher in connec-
tion with its business. 83 Floridians seem pleased with the results. According to Brodie
White of the Better Business Bureau of Northwest Florida, the list and the legislation
enacting it are the best weapons against telephone solicitations that he has seen in a long
time. 184
While there is always the possibility that people will be angered by the ineffective-
from exempted organizations. See id.
178. For a particularly business-friendly statute, see KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 367.46951(2) (Banks-
Baldwin Supp. 2000) (exempting from the statutory definition of "telephone solicitation" the following: real
estate brokers; investment advisors; insurance agents; employment agencies; newspaper and cable television
solicitors; merchants regulated by the Public Service Commission; merchants soliciting the sale of food in
orders of less than $100; businesses that issue catalogs to at least 250,000 customers; businesses regulated by
the Department for Financial Institutions; merchants subject to control or licensing by the FCC; book, video,
or record clubs; merchants who call only to set up a face-to-face meeting to continue the solicitation; Kentucky
businesses that have operated under the same name for at least two years and which derive most of their reve-
nue from sales of products or services at a retail establishment; and merchants who are publicly traded corpo-
rations).
179. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.46955(15) (Banks-Baldwin Supp. 2000) (It is a prohibited telephone
solicitation act or practice for any telemarketing company to engage in "[m]aking or causing to be made an
unsolicited telephone solicitation call if the number for that telephone appears in the current publication of the
'no telephone solicitation calls' list maintained by the Office of the Attorney General, Division of Consumer
Protection ...").
180. See Telemarketing No-Call List (last modified Feb. 5, 2001) <http://www.law.state.ky.us/cp/ no-
call.htm> ("Only companies 'engaged primarily in the business of conducting telephone solicitations' are
prohibited from calling consumers on the no-call list. Thus, companies and non-profit organizations who
conduct their own telemarketing sales calls will not be affected since they are not engaged primarily in the
business of making telephone solicitations."); see also supra note 178 for a list of exemptions to the Kentucky
no-call rules.
181. See Moore, supra note 8 (quoting Terence McElroy of the Florida Department of Agriculture and
Consumer Services).
182. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.059(4) (West Supp. 2001).
183. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.059(1)(c) (West Supp. 2001).
184. See Moore, supra note 8.
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ness of a database approach fraught with exemptions, the Florida example indicates that
this need not necessarily be so. Provided that any exceptions to a do-not-call require-
ment are sensible and narrowly-tailored, consumers are likely to favor such a law.' 85 An
eighty percent reduction in sales calls' 86-- like an eighty percent accuracy rate in a na-
tional no-solicitation list187-might not be perfect, but, to consumer privacy advocates, it
represents a drastic improvement upon the status quo.1 88 Nevertheless, database oppo-
nents advance still another argument against no-call laws-this one calculated to appeal
to these same privacy advocates.
e. The effect of a no-solicitation database on consumer privacy
According to the FCC, several commentators question whether the confidentiality
of those who place their names on do-not-call listings could be adequately protected
from unscrupulous telemarketers.189 A widely-accessible database, it has been argued,
might be used by some firms a a solicitation list, rather than for its intended purpose.' 90
Such a development could render no-call legislation useless-or, worse, make it coun-
terproductive. Despite these concerns, no-call legislation need not be drafted in a way
that would invite misuse of do-not-call lists.
According to Private Citizen, the DMA sells names, addresses, and phone numbers
from its do-not-call list to telemarketers--ostensibly to facilitate compliance with do-
not-call requests.' 9' It is plausible, however, that a "discourteous'' 192 telemarketer might
prefer to take his chances calling numbers from an information-laden, fairly inexpensive
no-solicitation list, as opposed to obtaining its solicitation list through other channels.'
93
185. See, e.g., Wheeler, Curb on Telemarketers Dies in Senate Panel, supra note 175 (citing comments
by Maryland Sen. Jean Roesser that Sen. Astle's "false perception" argument is a red herring-"'[d]on't sell
the public short,' she said, '[t]hey would have known what the score is"').
186. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
187. See supra text accompanying note 173.
188. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 8 (quoting Brodie White, who calls the Florida statute a significant law,.
with teeth behind it, because it warns unwelcome telemarketers: "if you call this person you are bound to be
prosecuted"). Consider the thoughts expressed in a recent Missouri editorial:
Like thousands of Missourians, I plan to get my name on [Missouri's] list of people
who do not want to be called by telemarketers. Not that I expect the calls to end, since
some, like telephone and insurance companies and members of not-for-profit agencies
are not included in the ban. What thrills me most is the satisfaction of knowing that a
limitation can be placed on some of the nuisances and irritations that we have been
forced to accept as commonplace. I've always resented the fact that I have to pay a
monthly bill for a telephone that I had installed for my personal convenience and then
have it usurped by people I don't want to be in communication with.
Rose M. Nolen, Editorial, Rude Awakening: Telemarketers Rang In This Era of Incivility, ST. LOUIS
DISPATCH, Jan. 21, 2001, at B3, available in 2001 WL 4440204.
189. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
190. See id.
191. See The DMA - A.K.A. the Discourteous Marketing Association, supra note 52.
192. Id.
193. Private Citizen reports that it is aware of at least one firm that claims to have used the DMA's no-
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Such misuse is possible if consumers, to join a no-call list, are required to provide their
names, street addresses, and so forth. 194 The more information a telemarketer possesses,
the easier it is for that telemarketer to target his call to a particular person in a specific
neighborhood. Private Citizen, for its part, has responded to this potential problem by
developing a no-call directory that provides the names, locations, and phone numbers of
members in separate listings. Accordingly, telemarketers will not know which numbers
belong to which member. 95 The DMA of England requires even less information: all a
Briton must provide to join the British Telephone Preference Service is her phone num-
ber. 19 6 According to Private Citizen, phone numbers are really all an effective do-not-
call list need contain.
97
Concerns expressed by telemarketers that no-call lists may be abused are likely ex-
aggerated and may reflect little more than an attempt by database opponents to thwart
meaningful regulation of the industry. 98 After all, a powerful benefit of do-not-call
legislation is that it permits registrants to hold non-exempted telemarketers who call
them accountable for their transgressions.'99 Moreover, one would expect most telemar-
keters to heed do-not-call requests in the first place.200 According to one telemarketing
firm, it makes little business sense to waste resources contacting people who are antago-
nistic to the firm's efforts. 20 ' That being so, it seems that the strongest arguments against
no-call legislation are that it would be costly, overly restrictive, and might dispropor-
tionately affect small businesses.
f Financial and regulatory burdens
A main reason the FCC declined to establish a do-not-call database pursuant to its
rulemaking power under the TCPA was the perceived cost and its impact on smaller
telemarketers. 20 2 Initial setup costs could range from $20 million to $80 million, and
database maintenance might require annual expenditures of up to $20 million more.2 °3
solicitation list as a mailing list. See supra note 52.
194. See, e.g., How to Get Off a Telephone List - Consumer Assistance, supra note 37 (requiring those
who wish to register for the DMA's TPS list to send their name, home address, home telephone number, and
signature to the DMA in a letter or on a postcard).
195. See The Private Citizen Directory (last modified Mar. 6, 2001) <http:/www.private-
citizen.com/directory.htm> (explaining that the directory's layout prevents its use as a telemarketing or junk
mailing list).
196. See The DMA - A.K.A. the Discourteous Marketing Association, supra note 52.
197. See id.
198. It is interesting that the industry, on the one hand, claims that it is responsible enough to self-
regulate through the use of the DMA's TPS and company-specific no-call listings while, on the other hand,
warns that a mandatory no-call database would be misused by the same responsible telemarketers.
199. See, e.g., supra note 188.
200. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
201. See MAJORTY REPORT, supra note 38, at 14.
202. See In re Rules & Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 7 F.C.C.R.
8752, 8758 (1992).
203. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. While these figures may seem exorbitant in the abstract,
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Forcing small businesses that engage in telemarketing to bear part of this burden, some
commentators say, may overwhelm them.204 Nevertheless, the language of the TCPA
demonstrates that Congress considered this issue.
Congress took care in adopting the TCPA to ensure that the FCC's database regula-
tions-if a database were implemented-would not overly burden small businesses. For
instance, Congress would require the FCC to consider the costs of do-not-call lists to
small businesses and to develop different fee schedules for businesses serving differ-
ently-sized markets. 20 5 Accordingly, fears that no-call legislation would cripple smaller
telemarketers are probably unwarranted. The FCC's suggestion that "[r]egional or local
telemarketers could be required to purchase a national do-not-call database even if they
made no solicitations beyond their states or regions,, 20 6 for example, is undercut by the
prescriptions of the TCPA.2 °7
Another financial consideration for small businesses, the FCC has said, relates to
internal compliance measures. According to the FCC, most small businesses would need
to invest in computer software and hardware to grapple with computerized lists,
20 8
which would impact small or start-up businesses more than larger, established firms.2°
These concerns may have been relevant when the FCC issued its report, but they seem
antiquated less than one decade later.21 0 All but the smallest of businesses are likely to
it is worth noting that the telemarketing industry now provides 3.5 million jobs in the United States. See supra
note 34. Consider a system under which telemarketing firms contributed to a database maintenance fund in
proportion to the number of solicitors they employed. After the implementation of the system, if each telemar-
keting firm were to devote the equivalent of one hour's salary at the federal minimum wage for each of its
solicitors, it would have practically fulfilled its proportional share of the estimated annual cost of maintaining
the database ($5.25 times 3.5 million employees equals $18,375,000).
204. See In re Rules & Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 7 F.C.C.R.
at 8758.
205. According to 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(4), if the FCC adopts the database approach, it shall:
(A) in developing procedures for gaining access to the database, consider the different
needs of telemarketers conducting business on a national, regional, State, or local
level;
(B) develop a fee schedule or price structure for recouping the cost of such database that
recognizes such differences and-
(i) reflect the relative costs of providing a national, regional, State, or local list of
phone numbers of subscribers who object to receiving telephone solicitations;
(ii) reflect the relative costs of providing such lists of paper or electronic media; and
(iii) not place an unreasonable financial burden on small business ....
47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(4) (1994).
206. In re Rules & Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 7 F.C.C.R. at
8760.
207. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(4); supra note 205.
208. See supra note 127.
209. See In re Rules & Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 7 F.C.C.R.
8752, 8760 (1992).
210. Cf Mark Hummels, State Lawmaker Plans Consumer-Privacy Proposals, SANTA FE NEW
MEXICAN, Jan. 21, 2001, at BI, available in 2001 WL 6315047 ("[T]imes have changed since 1991. The
revolution in information technology has made is possible for companies to compile, swap and sell consumer
data in ways never before contemplated.").
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have adequate computer hardware to view and sort a no-call list today. Moreover, while
the price of obtaining appropriate software or purchasing a do-not-call list might con-
ceivably appear steep for a few smaller telemarketers, by using do-not-call lists, these
companies may actually save money.21" According to the majority staff of the House
subcommittee discussed supra, using do-not-call lists increases telemarketers' cost ef-
fectiveness. 21 2 Because "individuals on those lists have a pre-determined. propensity not
to buy,",213 a telemarketer can spend his or her time attempting to contact consumers
who have not already indicated that calling them would be unproductive.
Despite the potential benefits of a mandatory no-call system, former FCC Commis-
sioner Sherrie Marshall called the national database approach "extremely regulatory and
intrusive" because it "denies companies the opportunity to make a first-time contact
with a potential customer. 21 4 This argument ignores the reality that people who might
desire to purchase telemarketed goods or services may choose not to join a database;
furthermore, it does not explain how calling a self-identified unreceptive consumer
would do anything but waste a telemarketer's time and money. While telemarketers may
feel that do-not-call regulations are intrusive, many Americans have a similar perception
of sales calls.215 According to one commentator, "[t]elemarketing calls are especially
intrusive because they are the electronic equivalent of 'junk mail,' not wanted by the
vast majority of recipients, but, unlike junk mail, they cannot easily be disposed of."
2 16
There are numerous arguments against the creation of a national no-solicitation da-
tabase, but most of them seem to be little more than token efforts by businesses to avoid
extra regulation. Nevertheless, the FCC cited many of these arguments in support of its
211. See Paul Choiniere, New Law Gives Connecticut Residents Chance To Curb Calls from Telemar-
keters, DAY (New London, Conn.), Jan. 1, 2001, available in LEXIS, News, Knight Ridder/Tribune Business
News (citing Pat Faley of the DMA, who says that because it is that unlikely consumers who place their names
on no-call lists would ever buy a product from a telemarketer, not calling these consumers will save telemar-
keters time and money).
212. See MAJORITY REPORT, supra note 35, at 23.
213. Id.
214. Communications, FCC Privacy Rules Will Balance Consumer, Business Interests, Marshall Says,
supra note 11. Proponents of no-call legislation may appreciate the business interests involved, but many feel
that these interests must yield to people's desire to be left alone in this circumstance. Persistent telemarketing
calls, one journalist says, "have become a scourge of American life" and have become "a rare object of loath-
ing that cuts across gender, class, and culture." Fred Kaplan, Demands for Privacy Curb Telemarketers,
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 26, 2000, at Al, available in 2000 WL 3356952. Because the intrusiveness of these
calls affects and annoys so many people, Washington State Sen. Bob Morton believes telemarketing jobs must
take a back seat to will of the majority. See Richard Roesler, Bills Target Telephone Solicitors, SPOKESMAN-
REVIEW (Spokane, Wash.), Jan. 24, 2001, at Al, available in 2001 WL 7044834. According to California
State Sen. Liz Figueroa, "'[t]here is a time and place for government to step in, and this is one of the those
times ....' Lundstrom, supra note 149. But see Jacob Sullum, They Had This Number, WASH. TIMES, Nov.
23, 2000, at A17, available in LEXIS, News, The Washington Times (opining that no-call laws may not be an
appropriate use of government power).
215. See, e.g., Martinez, supra note 9 ("Short of monitoring every call, ripping the phone out of the wall
or hunting down and torturing every unwanted caller, laws are the only means we have of protecting ourselves
against America's corporate effort to drive us all crazy.").
216. Zitter, supra note 28, at 627-28.
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decision not to adopt a database approach in 1992.217 Whatever the position of the FCC
and telemarketing interests, consumers are largely unpersuaded. To this end, Americans
have been pressuring their state representatives to pass no-call legislation at the state
level.
B. Do-Not-Call Laws at the State Level
Whereas the FCC has not exercised its statutory power to create a national no-
telephone-solicitations database,218 at least twelve states219 have already seized upon the
TCPA's savings clause220 to enact similar restrictions of their own. Consumers have
been quick to sign on to state do-not-call lists, but not all statutes are created equal. De-
pending on the number of telemarketers exempted from a particular statute's prescrip-
tions and the vigor with which these laws are enforced, results have varied across the
country. Notwithstanding the strength of any particular law, doubts linger about the
constitutionality of states attempting to enforce their laws against out-of-state telemar-
keters. Ultimately, consumers' best defense against unwanted sales calls may be to con-
vince Congress to require a nationwide do-not-call system.
1. The No-Call Landscape at the Close of the Twentieth Century
In response to consumer complaints about telemarketing calls 21 and a growing be-
lief among citizens that federal regulation of telephone solicitation is too lax,222 several
states have passed legislation implementing statewide do-not-call lists.223 According to
217. Congressional staff later accused the FCC of acceding to industry persuasion with respect to its de-
cision not to implement the database provision of the TCPA. See MAJORrrY REPORT, supra note 35, at 16.
218. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 119.
220. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
221. See, e.g., Ken Miller, Sick of Telemarketers? Sign Up for 'No-Call' List, IDAHO STATESMAN, Nov.
17, 2000, at 1, available in 2000 WL 28733365 ("Gripes about telemarketers are consistently among the top
10 areas of complaints to the [Idaho Consumer Protection Unit's] consumer affairs office."); Resler, Measure
Has Nice Ring to It, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Dec. 4, 2000, at I OA, available in 2000 WL 26099517 ("Only
three years ago, gripes about telemarketers ranked 29th in volume among all written complaints received by
[Wisconsin] state consumer protection officials. Last year, telemarketing complaints had zoomed to No. 7 on
the list and this year will probably break the top 5.").
222. See Petty, supra note 33, at 46.
223. See Jerry Markon, Take Me Off Your List! (Pretty Please?), STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul),
Dec. 27, 2000, at ID, available in 2000 WL 7003353. According to Markon,
[tihe laws have spread in response to rising complaints about telemarketers, whose
ranks have swelled because of economic growth and declining long-distance phone
rates. Another factor is dissatisfaction with . .. federal law[s] that require[] individual
telemarketers to keep a list of consumers who say they don't want to be called by them
again. Unlike the state laws, the weaker federal law[s] require[] consumers to tell the
telemarketers directly of their disinterest. The federal law[s] also contain[] numerous
exemptions and allow[] a company to escape fines ... if it can show that it trained its
personnel and any subsequent call was an undefined "error."
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one journalist, that momentum for these laws has built so quickly across the nation is "a
signal of how unpopular telemarketing has become among Americans. '224 Indeed, the
majority of state no-call laws enacted before 2001-as the following table illustrates-
have become effective within the past two years.
State Compilation Method for Do-Not-Call Requests Effective
Alabama database operated by the Public Service Commission25  2000
Alaska Identification in telephone directory2 26  1996
Arkansas database operated by the Attorney General2 27  2000
Connecticut "no sales solicitation calls" listing maintained by the 2001
Department of Consumer Protection 28
Florida "no sales solicitation calls" listing updated by the Flor- 1997
ida Public Service Commission229
Georgia database operated by the Public Service Commission
23
1 1999
Idaho "no telephone solicitation contact" list published by the 2001
Attorney General
231
Kentucky "no telephone solicitation calls" list maintained by 1998
the Office of the Attorney General 232
Id.
224. Savoye, supra note 117.
225. See ALA. CODE § 8-19C-2 (Supp. 2000).
226. See ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.475 (Michie Supp. 2000); see generally "No Call List" (Alaska's Black
Dot Law) (visited Mar. 20, 2001) <http://www.law.state.ak.us/consumer/tele-stop.html>.
227. See ARK. CODE. ANN. § 4-99-404 (Michie Supp. 1999); see generally Do Not Call - Arkansas
Telemarketing Removal List Information (last modified Dec. 7, 2000) <http://www.donotcall.org>.
228. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-288a(b) (West Supp. 2001); see generally DCP Telemarketing NO
CALL List (last modified Mar. 17, 2001) <http://www.state.ct.us/dcp/nocall.htm>.
229. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.059 (West Supp. 2001); see generally Florida Division of Consumer Ser-
vices: No Sales Solicitation (visited Mar. 20, 2001) <http://www.800helpfla.con/-cs/nosales.html>.
230. See GA. CODE. ANN. § 46-5-27 (Supp. 2000); see generally Georgia No-Call List Web Site (last
modified Nov. 12, 1998) <http://www.ganocall.com>.
231. IDAHO CODE § 48-1003A (Michie Supp. 2000); see generally Idaho No Call List Registration (vis-
ited Mar. 20, 2001) <https://www.accessidaho.org/secapps/ag/nocall/register.html>.
232. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.46955 (Banks-Baldwin Supp. 2000); see generally Telemarketing No-
Call List (last modified Feb. 5,2001) <http://www.law.state.ky.us/cp/nocall.htm>.
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Missouri database established by the Attorney General233  2001
New York registry maintained by the Consumer Protection 2001
Board4
Oregon database maintained by an administrator pursuant to 1999
contract with the Attorney General
235
Tennessee database established by the Tennessee Regulatory 2000
Authority
23 6
While no-call legislation may be a relatively recent phenomenon,237 Americans are
rushing to take advantage of it wherever possible.238 More than 1.6 million people had
signed up for state-sponsored no-call lists or databases by the end of 2000.239 In Mis-
souri, 110,000 residents joined during the first week of registration240-50,000 in the
first two days alone.241 Tennessee's database includes 535,000 telephone numbers,24 2
and 430,000 New Yorkers have already sought inclusion in the Empire State's registry,
which becomes effective April 1, 2001.243 According to one New York official, the do-
not-call registry is "'one of the fastest growing state programs ever."- 244 While no-call
laws may be popular among consumers, 245 however, critics say these statutes are far
233. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 407.1101 (West Supp. 2001); see generally Missouri No Call Law (last
modified Jan. 2, 2001) <http://www.ago.state.mo.us/nocalltaw.htm>.
234. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 399-z (McKinney Supp. 2001); see generally Do Not Call Preregistra-
tion (last modified Oct. 27, 2000) <https://www.consumer.state.ny.us/prereg.htm>.
235. See OR. REv. STAT. § 646.574 (Supp. 1999); see generally Oregon "No Call" List Website (last
modified Jan. 20, 2000) <http://www.omocall.com>.
236. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 65-4-405 (Supp. 2000); see generally TRA Do Not Call List (last modified
Mar. 9, 2001) <http://www2.state.tn.us/tra/nocall.htm>.
237. See Jim Bencivenga, Resolved: One, Two, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 4, 2001, at 11, available
in 2001 WL 3732806 (noting that do-not-call laws are in their infancy).
238. So popular is the Missouri law, in fact, that people from bordering states have been calling Missouri
officials in hopes of being placed on the Missouri no-call list. See Savoye, supra note 117 (quoting Rosie
Head, an administrative assistant for the state).
239. See Markon, supra note 223.
240. See Savoye, supra note 117.
241. See Bell, supra note 117.
242. See Karin Miller, Tire Recall Voted Tennessee's Top Business Story for Year 2000, CHATrANOOGA
TIMES, Dec. 27, 2000, at C 1, available in LEXIS, News, Chattanooga Times / Chattanooga Free Press.
243. See Change of Jobs amid Bid Probe, TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), Jan, 22, 2001, available in 2001
WL 6287690.
244. Paula Voell, Help for Victims of Scams, Telemarketers, BUFF. NEWS, Dec. 5, 2000, at IC, available
in 2000 WL 5701878 (quoting Jon Sorensen, spokesman for the New York Consumer Protection Board).
245. See, e.g., Choiniere, supra note 211 (calling Connecticut's no-call law "tremendously popular with a
public that has become increasingly annoyed with . . . unsolicited [calls]"); Miller, supra note 221 (quoting
Idaho Att'y Gen. Al Lance, who called the Idaho statute the most popular piece of legislation with which he
has ever been involved).
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from perfect. As one journalist has pointed out, a myriad of exemptions and lax en-
forcement in many states threaten their ultimate effectiveness.
24 6
2. Exemptions
No-call laws can offer consumers the ability to opt out of most unwanted sales
calls, 2 47 provided that they are not burdened by exemptions for too many types of solici-
tors. While some statutes are fairly effective, and some are merely adequate, still others
have enough loopholes to render them practically unenforceable.248 In each state, ac-
cording to one journalist, "the statutes are layered with exemptions for charities, politi-
cal groups, and companies that already have a relationship with the consumer. 249
Statutes that go only this far are the more effective ones. Oregon's no-call law, for
example, permits just four exemptions:
If you ask a business to call you about a product, they're allowed to make the call. If
the telemarketer is calling on behalf of a charity you've donated to in the past, the call
is allowed. Similarly, if you've done business with a company in the past, they're al-
lowed to call you. Finally, you can be called by someone doing a public opinion sur-
vey, but only if it's not connected to selling a service or product. 25°
New York officials predict their new no-solicitation law will be one of the strongest
in the nation25' because it also includes very few exceptions to the statutory definition of
unsolicited telemarketing calls.2 52 Similarly, Florida law-discussed supra253-allows a
mere four exemptions254 and purportedly eliminates 70% to 80% of unwanted sales calls
to Florida homeowners. 255 Nevertheless, not all states have legislation that offers this
246. See Markon, supra note 223.
247. See Bencivenga, supra note 237.
248. See id.
249. Markon, supra note 223.
250. Margie Boule, Telling Telemarketers Where To Go, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Dec. 14, 2000, at E01,
available In 2000 WL 27112653. See OR. REV. STAT. § 646.557 (Supp. 1999).
251. See Fried, supra note 40 (citing Jon Sorensen).
252. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 399-z(1)(j) (McKinney Supp. 2001), defining an "unsolicited telemar-
keting sales call" as any telemarketing sales call other than a call made:
(i) in response to an express written or verbal request of the customer called; or
(ii) in connection with an established business relationship, which has not been ter-
minated by either party; or
(iii) to an existing customer, unless such customer has stated to the telemarketer that
such customer no longer wishes to receive the telemarketing sales calls of such
telemarketer; or
(iv) in which the sale of goods and services is not completed, and payment or au-
thorization of payment is not required until after a face-to-face sales presentation
by the telemarketer or a meeting between the telemarketer and customer.
Id.
253. See supra notes 181-84 and accompanying text.
254. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.059(l)(c) (West Supp. 2001).
255. See supra note 181.
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level of protection from telemarketing calls.
According to Robert Blumash, founder of Private Citizen, laws in other states may
only reduce telemarketing by 15% or 20% because they allow for so many excep-
tions.256 In reality, statistics from certain states are more ominous than that. Twenty-two
categories of telemarketers can ignore Kentucky's do-not-call list, making the Kentucky
law one of the weakest in the nation. 257 Some consumer advocates label the law a
"farce" 258 because, due to its numerous exemptions, the statute blocks only 5% of
would-be telemarketing calls to Kentucky homes.259 The effectiveness of no-call legisla-
tion, it seems, has much to do with how broad the statutory coverage happens to be in a
given state. It also depends on how well the states actually enforce their no-call laws.
3. Enforcement
Part of the reason that telemarketing call volume has decreased so negligibly in
many states is that solicitors are violating the law without being punished.260 According
to a recent editorial, "[allthough telemarketers who ignore.. . 'do not call' lists could..
face heavy fines, most states have gone easy" on them.26' Consider the situations in
Alaska and Arkansas, for example. No Alaska telemarketer has been fined since passage
of no-call legislation in 1996. Arkansas has yet to fine anyone either-probably because
the state allows telephone solicitors eight to ten free violations. 262 Even states that do
fine telemarketers do not necessarily do so to the full extent the laws allow. Florida,
while it his exacted approximately $450,000 in fines for illegal calls, often settles with
telemarketers for $1000, rather than the maximum allowable penalty of$10,000.2 63 This
is not to say, however, that other states are not vigorously prosecuting telemarketers
who violate no-call laws.
In Oregon, the Attorney General's office is going after telemarketers who violate
the state's two-year-old no-call law.2 64 Thus far, Oregon has collected $90,000-all
during a three-month period.265 The state settled cases with twenty telemarketers in No-
256. See Markon, supra note 223.
257. See Dateline NBC: Consumer Alert, Call of the Wild; Telemarketers Invading Americans' Homes
(NBC television broadcast, Dec. 5, 2000) (transcript available in LEXIS, News, Transcripts) [hereinafter
Dateline NBC]; see also supra note 178.
258. See Dateline NBC, supra note 257.
259. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
260. See Choiniere, supra note 211 (noting that Private Citizen "estimates that because of both violators
and the many no-call exceptions telemarketing calls have been trimmed by as little as 20 percent in some
states"); see also Curbing Telemarketers: A New Bill Might Reduce the Irritation, RECORD (N. N.J.), Jan. 7,
2001, at 02, available in 2001 WL 5232632 ("The problem that many ... states have faced is an utter lack of
enforcement.").
261. Curbing Telemarketers, supra note 245.
262. See Markon, supra note 223.
263. See id.
264. See Boule, supra note 250.
265. See Voell, supra note 244.
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vember of 2000266 and fifteen more in early January 2001. In addition to paying fines to
the Department of Justice Consumer Protection and Education Fund, violators pledged
to change their operating procedures to comply with the no-call law.267 Probably not
surprisingly, the Oregon law is working.268 According to one Oregonian who signed up
for the state's database in May of 2000, "[i]t was not more than two or three weeks, and
the calls just stopped coming .... It was absolutely great. 269 Such are the potential
results when a resident invokes his statutory right not to receive telemarketing calls in a
state that offers a strong no-call statute270 and has an attorney general willing to enforce
it.
While consumers are largely excited by the prospect of reducing interrupting sales
calls via state legislation, it remains to be seen whether current state no-call laws pass
constitutional muster.
4. Constitutional Questions Untested
271
Although the telemarketing industry has yet to take its case to court, state do-not-
call laws may not be constitutional.272 In fact, there appear to be at least two potential
impediments to state regulation. The first is whether the TCPA and the FCC's rules
implementing that law preempt state no-call laws. The second is the so-called "dormant"
aspect of the Commerce Clause, which limits states from enacting laws that have the
purpose or effect of discriminating against interstate commerce in some way, even in the
absence of congressional action.
a. Federal preemption
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit briefly addressed the is-
sue of potential state-law preemption by the TCPA in Van Bergen v. Minnesota.27 3 At
266. According to reporter Margie Boule,
court actions were filed against telemarketing companies trying to sell, among other
things, hearing aids, auto glass, vacation time shares, bottled water and the ubiquitous
vinyl siding to people on the no-call list. The state worked out settlements with those
companies, which now will pay fines of over $100,000. That money will cover the cost
of running the program.
Boule, supra note 250.
267. See Sherri Buri McDonald, Oregon Accuses 15 Companies of Violating Telemarketing No-Call
Law, REGISTER GUARD (Eugene, Or.), Jan. 3, 2001, available in 2001 WL 2835522.
268. See Boule, supra note 250.
269. See id. (quoting Oregon resident Richard Koonce).
270. See, e.g., supra notes 235-40 and accompanying text (discussing the no-call laws of Oregon, New
York, and Florida).
271. These issues may merit more in-depth treatment elsewhere; this Note attempts only to indicate in a
cursory manner that there may be a constitutional battle on the horizon over state no-call laws.
272. See Fiske, supra note 32.
273. Van Bergen v. Minnesota, 59 F.3d 1541 (8th Cir. 1995). Van Bergen, a candidate for governor, in-
stituted his suit claiming, in part, that because the Minnesota statute imposed less restrictive requirements on
20011
Journal of Legislation
issue in Van Bergen was the constitutionality of a Minnesota statute that regulated the
use of automatic dialing-announcing devices, which Congress had already restricted in
the TCPA. According to the Van Bergen court, "[flederal law can preempt state law
without an express statement by Congress when the federal statute implies an intention
to preempt state law or when state law directly conflicts with federal law."
274
Congress provided in the TCPA that "nothing in this section or in the regulations
prescribed under this section shall preempt any State law that imposes more restrictive
intrastate requirements or regulations .... 2 75 Thus, the states may impose stricter rules
upon in-state telemarketers who call residents of the same state.276 What remains unclear
is whether state regulations that have the effect of restricting out-of-state telemarketers
are permitted under the TCPA or in light of Congress's general power to regulate inter-
state commerce. Although there is no express statement in the TCPA that indicates Con-
gress wanted to preempt state laws that affect interstate telemarketing, a court might
conclude that the statute implied that intent.
2 77
Even if the states can prevail on the issue of preemption, no-call laws might also be
attacked as being in violation of the Commerce Clause. It is this second concern that
would seem to present the more serious impediment to the validity of state do-not-call
laws. 78
b. Commerce Clause concerns
The Commerce Clause, for one thing, grants Congress the positive power to regu-
the use of automatic dialing-announcing devices than did the TCPA, the TCPA preempted the statute. See id.
at 1547. This argument failed to persuade the court, which found that the TCPA's "savings clause ... does not
state that all less restrictive requirements are preempted; it merely states that more restrictive requirements are
not preempted. The TCPA, therefore, does not expressly preempt the Minnesota statute." Id. at 1547-48. The
potential constitutional challenge regarding state no-call laws, however, presents a different issue-that is,
whether a state can reach across its border to regulate the behavior of telemarketers calling its residents in light
of Congress's Commerce Clause power, exercised through Congress's passage of the TCPA and the FCC's
promulgation of the related regulations.
274. Id. at 1548 (citations omitted).
275. 47 U.S.C. § 227(e)(1) (1994) (emphasis added); see also supra note 98 and accompanying text.
276. State no-call laws are a perfect example: their constitutionality is not challenged to the extent that
they regulate purely intrastate telemarketing calls.
277. According to § 2(7) of the TCPA, although states have statutes restricting various telemarketing
practices, "telemarketers can evade their prohibitions through interstate operations." Pub. L. No. 102-243, §
2(7), 105 Stat. 2394, 2394 (1991). This, in fact, was a main reason why Congress passed the TCPA. See id.
(stating "therefore, Federal law is needed to control residential telemarketing practices"). Based upon this
language, telemarketers might argue that Congress thought state laws such as those at issue here were pre-
empted by federal law. This might explain why Congress felt it was necessary to craft the savings clause
exception for intrastate requirements.
278. Courts have invalidated "a large number of state regulations affecting interstate commerce" on
Dormant Commerce Clause grounds. Charles R. Topping, Note, The Surf is Up, But Who Owns the Beach?-
Who Should Regulate Commerce on the Internet?, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 179, 206
(1999).
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late commerce among the several states.2 7 9 Moreover, the Supreme Court has ruled that
the Commerce Clause operates on a negative basis to prevent state laws that unduly
burden interstate commerce. 280 This negative implication is often referred to as the
Dormant Commerce Clause. 28 As one author explains,
[tihe U.S. Supreme Court has held that the clause not only empowers Congress to
regulate interstate commerce, but also thwarts the states' power to enact laws that in-
terfere with interstate commerce.... In General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, the Court
stated that "[tihe negative or dormant implication of the Commerce Clause prohibits
state taxation or regulation that discriminates against or unduly burdens interstate
commerce and thereby 'imped[es] free private trade in the national marketplace."'
Thus, a state regulation found to be discriminatory or unduly burdensome to interstate
commerce will be invalidated, even though it might concern an area that Congress has
chosen not to regulate.282
Although there is no direct precedent on the Dormant Commerce Clause as it ap-
plies to telephone solicitation, recant decisions in cases involving state-based regulation
of the Internet mayprovide insight into how courts would rule on challenges to no-call
legislation.283 In American Library Ass'n v. Pataki,284 for example, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York found that a New York statute
designed to keep people from transmitting harmful material to children over the Internet
violated the Constitution.285 According to the district court, "the practical impact of the
New York Act results in the extraterritorial application of New York law to transactions
involving citizens of other states. ' '28 6 Because the Act, "[bly its terms, . . .applies to any
communication, intrastate or interstate, that fits within the prohibition" against transmit-
ting harmful materials to minors, 287 Judge Preska wrote, the statute was "per se violative
279. See U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 3.
280. See General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 287 (1997) (citing Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S.
429, 437 (1980)).
281. See id.
282. Topping, supra note 278, at 205-06 (citations omitted).
283. See generally Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan 0. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785, 788-94 (2001) (reviewing Dormant Commerce Clause principles and describing
their application to state-based regulation of the Internet).
284. 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
285. The statute made it a felony for an individual,
[kinowing the character and content of the communication which, in whole or in part,
depicts actual or simulated nudity, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse, and
which is harmful to min rs, [to] intentionally use[] any computer communication sys-
tem allowing the input, output, examination or transfer, of computer data or computer
programs from one computer to another, to initiate or engage in such communication
with a person who is a minor.
Id. at 163 (quoting the New York statute).
286. Id. at 183.
287. Id. at 169-70.
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of the Commerce Clause."
2 88
Similar to the state's prior attempt at Internet regulation, New York's do-not-call
law includes no provision to prevent its extraterritorial (interstate) enforcement. 2 9 Were
a court to apply reasoning similar to that employed in Pataki, it might find that New
York's do-not-call law violates the Commerce Clause as well. 290 Furthermore, because
the language of other state no-call laws is similar to New York's, those laws could also
face constitutional obstacles when subjected to judicial review.
291
288. Id. at 183-84. But see James E. Gaylord, Student Article, State Regulatory Jurisdiction and the
Internet: Letting the Dormant Commerce Clause Lie, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1095, 1127 (1999) (concluding that
"the history of extraterritoriality suggests that courts will ultimately be forced to withdraw from the absolute
prohibition of state regulation of the Internet announced in [Patakil"). According to Gaylord, caselaw indi-
cates that courts may retreat from an absolute ban on state-based Internet regulation "by finding a nexus re-
quirement in the dormant Commerce Clause." Id. Under this requirement, Gaylord hypothesizes, "the test
employed by future courts might simply inquire into the strength of the connection between the state's regula-
tory interest and the enterprise sought to be regulated." Id. Gaylord believes such a test would permit states to
"enact zoning legislation targeted at actors who knowingly aim their conduct toward the state." Id. If this
assumption is correct, courts could eventually give states the green light to regulate out-of-state telemarketers
who knowingly target their solicitation calls to residents of a particular state as well.
289. The New York law provides that "[n]o telemarketer or seller may make or cause to be made any un-
solicited telemarketing sales call to any customer more than thirty days after the customer's name and tele-
phone number or numbers appear on the then current quarterly no telemarketing sales calls registry ...." N.Y.
GEN. Bus. LAW § 399-z(3) (McKinney Supp. 2001). The statutory definition of "telemarketer" is not limited
to in-state callers, but includes "any person who, for financial profit or commercial purposes in connection
with telemarketing, makes telemarketing sales calls to a customer when the customer is in this state or any
person who directly controls or supervises the conduct of a telemarketer." Id. § 399-z(l)(g).
290. But see People v. Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (rejecting defendant's constitu-
tional challenge to state statute that criminalized distribution or exhibition of lewd material to a minor over the
Internet). The California court employed the Dormant Commerce Clause test set forth in Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970), and determined that state-based Internet regulation did not violate the
Commerce Clause. See Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 190. Under the Pike test,
[w]here the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public inter-
est, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless
the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative
local benefits. [Citation.] If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question be-
comes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course
depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be pro-
moted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.
Id. (citing Pike, 397 U.S. at 142). The California court, applying this test, noted that "the state's abiding
interest in preventing harm to minors" outweighed any effect the statute may have on interstate commerce. Id.
The precedential value of this opinion to states that might attempt to ward off constitutional challenges to their
no-call -laws is dubious; telemarketers would likely seek to distinguish it by arguing that any governmental
interest in protecting consumers from inconvenient telephone calls is far less substantial than the interest a
state has in protecting the safety of children within its borders.
291. Despite the potentially broad implications of the Pataki ruling, the Supreme Court of Washington
has recently handed down an opinion in a cyberlaw case that proponents of do-not-call legislation will wel-
come. At issue in Washington v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404 (2001) (en banc), was whether Washington's statute
governing misleading subject lines in unsolicited commercial electronic mail ("spam") imposed an unconstitu-
tional burden on interstate commerce. After an out-of-state resident sent sparn containing arguably misleading
subject-line information to Washington residents, the state supreme court distinguished Pataki and upheld the
regulation. According to the court, "[in contrast to the New York statute, which could reach all content posted
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The constitutional issues surrounding state no-call legislation have yet to be liti-
gated, but that may soon change. Industry lawyer Tyler Prochnow warns that, although
it has thus far been easier for out-of-state telemarketers to pay small penalties to avoid
amassing hefty legal bills by contesting the fines in court, the increasing number of state
no-call laws may lead to a courtroom showdown. 292 The outcome of such a fight would
likely decide the fate of no-call laws in general: if the states were not permitted to ad-
dress the problem of out-of-state telemarketers calling state residents, only Congress or
the FCC could enact effective do-not-call legislation-something for which neither body
has shown much inclination to date.
5. A Better Solution?
Even if state no-call laws are constitutional, they still may not offer the best possi-
ble solution to the problem of undesired telemarketing calls. While telemarketing inter-
ests generally oppose any form of no-call legislation, there may ultimately be calls from
the industry itself for the FCC to adopt a national database. After all, as states continue
to pass these laws, it will only become more difficult for telemarketers to keep up. Ac-
cording to a recent article, "[tirying to juggle no-call lists from a dozen states, along
with updates, creates a logistical nightmare for call centers, many of them small-budget
operations., '293 Industry personnel have already voiced concern; some would support the
creation of "a comprehensive list from all states and universal telemarketing rules" to
make compliance easier. 94 Provided that there are no successful challenges to the con-
stitutionality of state no-call laws and that states keep passing similar legislation,295 then,
it might behoove the FCC to reconsider its stance against a national do-not-call data-
on the Internet and therefore subject individuals to liability based on unintended access, the [Washington] Act
reaches only those deceptive [spain] messages directed to a Washington resident .... Id. at 412-13 (empha-
sis added). After making this distinction, the court concluded that the statute provided local benefits that out-
weighed any conceivable burden it imposed upon senders of spam and, accordingly, that it did not violate the
Dormant Commerce Clause. See id. at 413. No-call statutes could be construed similarly by reviewing courts.
292. See Fiske, supra note 32.
293. See Savoye, supra note 117.
294. Choiniere, supra note 211; cf Nadel, supra note 10, at 116 (noting that "one advantage of a national
model act is that the industry might be more receptive to proposals by a single, national group with special
experience in telecommunications").
295. It appears that states will pass additional no-call laws. The Mississippi Senate recently passed Sen-
ate Bill 2362, which would establish a no-call list, but, as of early February 2001, the legislation had yet to go
to the House. See Telephony, COMM. DAILY, Feb. 9, 2001, available in 2001 WL 5052538. On February 12,
2001, the Indiana House unanimously approved House Bill 1222, which, unlike the version that failed in the
2000 legislative session, would not require residents to pay a fee to have their numbers placed on a state do-
not-call list. Indiana Attorney General Steve Carter, who would administer the law, says he supports it. See
Martin DeAgostino, Senate Approves Changing Kindergarten Start Date, S. BEND TRB. (Ind.), Feb. 13, 2001,
at D3, available in 2001 WL 7305373. Numerous other states are currently considering similar legislation.
Because this Note does not reflect the results of this year's legislative sessions within the several states,
readers may wish to consult the web site of the National Conference of State Legislatures for the most recent





V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Advances in communications technology have led to an erosion of citizens' funda-
mental right to be left alone.297 This fact is especially evident when it comes to the
booming industry of commercial telephone solicitation. Telemarketing calls made to
American homes have increased dramatically in recent years, and the public has made
its disapproval known. While consumer groups, businesses, and politicians may quibble
over how to best balance the interests of consumers weary of receiving sales calls and
businesses eager to generate revenue and provide jobs, the Constitution does not pro-
hibit restrictions on commercial telemarketing. Current regulation of telemarketing prac-
tices comes from many sources: the states and the federal government have adopted a
variety of restrictions, the industry has tried to self-regulate so that it might prevent fur-
ther government intervention, and consumer groups have instituted their own plans to
facilitate maximum consumer benefit from the statutes currently in force.
Despite past attempts at regulation of the telemarketing industry, many Americans
remain dissatisfied. A hot topic in recent years, therefore, has been whether the states or
the federal government should strengthen consumer privacy rights by adopting do-not-
call legislation and setting up databases for consumers who wish to opt out of receiving
sales calls. Although Congress suggested that the FCC consider adopting a national
database approach almost a decade ago, the FCC ultimately rejected that idea, directing
telemarketers to keep company-specific no-call lists instead. At least twelve states have
already done what the FCC would not. Depending on the state and the specific loop-
holes in its no-call system, this legislation has generally been popular and reasonably
effective. Nevertheless, questions regarding the constitutionality of some state telemar-
keting legislation remain untested; it may be that states must confine their regulation to
calls made from within their borders. There is an indication that, as lawsuits to enforce
these no-call laws increase in frequency, telemarketers may stop paying the fines and
take their case to court.
If it turns out that only Congress can regulate interstate telemarketing calls, out-of-
state telemarketers may easily sidestep the dictates of state no-call legislation. Given this
possibility, as well as the burden that complying with numerous and varied state statutes
may cause telemarketers, a national do-not-call system may be the most uniform and
cost-efficient way to reduce unwanted telemarketing calls. 298 In the meantime, residents
of states with no-call legislation continue to take advantage of it. 299 Do-not-call laws
296. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
297. See Radner, supra note 31, at 376.
298. See Kolnicki, supra note 29, at 246.
299. Many state legislators do not seem bothered by the potential constitutional problems with state-
based databases, either. See, e.g., Fiske, supra note 32 (noting that Virginia "General Assembly members
seeking tighter restrictions on telemarketers say it is worth taking a chance on the constitutionality of a new
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may not be perfect, but, in the minds of many, they offer more promise to frustrated
consumers than the current less-restrictive alternatives. °0
Michael E. Shannon*
state law").
300. See, e.g., Michael Booth, Group To Push Call-Block Measure: Legislation Targets Telemarketers,
DENV. POST, Jan. 13, 2001, at AO, available in 2001 WL 6740370 (noting that, according to lobbyist Rutt
Bridges, "'[wie can't let the perfect be the assassin of the good').
*Candidate for J.D., Notre Dame Law School, 2002; B.S., Cornell University, 1999. The author wishes to
thank his grandmother, his mother, and his aunt for all their generous support-both financial and intangible--
during his long tour of academia; it has truly been a team effort. This Note is dedicated to them-and to Mary
Shanley Wald, who made law school look easy.
20011

